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We investigate the effects on health at birth of a shock generated by a major (25%) and unexpected 
wage cut austerity measure that affected all public sector employees in Romania in 2010. Our findings 
suggest an overall improvement in health at birth for boys exposed to the shock in early gestation and a 
decreased sex ratio at birth among early exposed children. These findings are consistent with the 
selection in utero theory hypothesizing that maternal exposure to a significant shock early in gestation 
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While unborn children are rarely, if ever, the direct targets of policy makers, they may be 
among the most affected individuals by policy changes. Within the framework of the fetal 
origin hypothesis put forward by Barker [1990], recent evidence shows that, indeed, 
disruptions in prenatal conditions, caused by fetal shocks,
1
 have scarring, life-long 
consequences (see Almond and Currie [2011a;b] for comprehensive reviews of this 
literature). Although some developmental insults may remain latent until adolescence or 
adulthood, they are typically apparent already at birth, reflected by outcomes such as birth 
weight, gestational length or sex ratio at birth. 
While prior work has found that extreme events (e.g., famines, wars, natural disasters)
2
 can 
substantially affect fetal health, little is still known about the effects of shocks induced by 
economic phenomena. Understanding whether and how economic downturns affect fetal 
development is especially relevant in the aftermath of the Great Recession, which caused 
significant economic disruptions and forced governments to impose harsh austerity measures. 
Public sector wages were frozen in numerous European countries, while others implemented 
wage cut policies.
3
 In this paper we exploit the most drastic wage cut austerity measure 
implemented in Europe, entailing a 25% cut in wages and in all the additional benefits for all 
public sector employees in Romania starting July 1
st
, 2010, after being firstly announced on 
May 7
th
, 2010. This led to a drop of 60.1 percentage points in the public sector wage 
premium.
4
 This unexpected and major wage cut policy provides an excellent setting to 
explore the effects of an income shock on health outcomes at birth.  
The effects of economic phenomena on fetal environment are, in general, quite difficult to 
disentangle as their timing is usually diffuse, lacking a precise onset date, and they may affect 
fetal health through multiple channels simultaneously (Almond and Currie [2011a]). During 
economic hardship, individuals may reduce expenditures on consumption goods, and 
nutritional restrictions may affect the unborn child. At the same time, the countercyclical 
pattern of consumption of health-damaging goods and the decrease of the opportunity cost of 
health-improving behaviour may offset the negative effects and lead to better infant heath at 
                                                          
1 Fetal shocks are defined broadly as events that alter the fetal environment, and give rise to fetal stressors that may induce 
developmental adaptations in the unborn child, as they signal a change in the predicted postnatal environment (Gluckman and 
Hanson [2005]). 
2 C.f. civil and military conflicts (Catalano [2003]; Mansour and Rees [2012]; Valente [2011]), natural disasters (Almond et 
al. [2009]), terrorist acts (Glyn et al. [2001]; Camacho [2008]) and pandemics (Almond [2006]). 
3 Wage cuts were implemented in: Romania (25%, 2010), Czech Republic (10%, 2011), Estonia (6%, 2009-2010), Greece 
(20%, 2012), Ireland (5%, 2010), Hungary (7%, 2008-2010),  Latvia (15%, 2009-2010), Lithuania (15%, 2009-2010), 
Portugal (5%, 2011), Slovenia (4%, 2011), Spain (5%, 2010).  
4 The public sector wage premium fell from +44.5% in 2009 to –15.6% in 2010 (a loss of 60.1 percentage points) (source: 




birth. In addition, maternal prenatal stress, caused by the financial insecurity entailed by 
economic shocks, may have either scarring or culling effects, leading to an ambiguous net 
effect of economic shocks on health at birth, depending on a wide array of factors. Thus, 
some studies find evidence of deteriorating health outcomes at birth (Bozzoli and Quintana-
Domeque [2013], Paxson and Schady [2004]; Burlando [2010]; Lindo [2011]), whereas 
others find that the effects of improvements in risk-related behavior during pregnancy and 
maternal selection prevail over the scarring effects, the net result being an improvement of the 
health of in utero exposed children (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney [2004]). Additionally, the sex-
ratio at birth has also been found to respond to economic circumstances (Catalano et al. 
[2005a;b]; [2009]). A recent study by Bozzoli and Quintana-Domeque [2013] documents the 
pro-cyclical effects of economic fluctuations in Argentina on the birth outcomes of children, 
noting that birth weights are sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations during the third 
trimester of pregnancy via the nutritional deprivations channel and during the first trimester of 
pregnancy via the maternal stress channel.
 5
  
However, all the effects observed, at birth and/or later on in life are, in reality, conditioned on 
the fetus surviving the pre-birth period. Medical literature finds that significant prenatal 
maternal stress, especially during early gestation, may induce a selective mortality of the least 
fit fetuses through increased miscarriages. This process, known as selection in utero, may 
yield a positive selection of those that are carried to term, visible in an improvement in the 
health outcomes of the affected cohort, with weak male fetuses significantly more affected 
than female fetuses (c.f. Hobel et al. [1999], Catalano et al. [2009], Valente [2011]). 
This paper contributes to the literature on the impacts of (negative) economic shocks on the 
health outcomes at birth by exploring a unique austerity measure, unexpected, in its 
magnitude and timing. The distinct occurrence of the shock eliminates the problem posed by 
diffuse timing or endogenous income reductions and allows us to pursue a clean identification 
strategy to infer the causal effects of a temporary income shock on birth outcomes of children 
exposed in utero. Our findings indicate that maternal exposure to significant fetal stressors 
may lead to what appears to be selection in utero. This is the first economic study to find 
evidence consistent with selection in utero induced by economic shocks.
6
  
                                                          
5 Almond et al. [2011] look at the effect of the Food Stamps Program in the US as a positive shock in utero and find 
improvements in health outcomes at birth.  
6 Evidence of selection in utero induced by economic shocks is provided in epidemiology and demography (e.g., Catalano et 
al [2009], Catalano [2003]); within economics, Valente [2011] documents selection in utero following civil conflict.  
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Our main empirical strategy to assess the impact of the unexpected income shock on health 
outcomes at birth is a simple difference-in-difference (DD) specification. We will focus on 
women already pregnant at the time of the austerity announcement, in an attempt to mitigate 
the concern related to the change in the composition of families choosing to conceive. We use 
the Romanian Vital Statistics Natality files, containing detailed records of all registered births, 
for the period 2007-2010, and compare outcomes at birth for children in utero at the time of 
the policy belongings to mothers employed in the public sector and housewife (or privately 
employed) mothers in 2010 relative to earlier years.  
Our main findings suggest an overall improvement in health at birth as measured by a 2 
percentage point (pp) decrease (29% of the mean) in the probability of low birth weight of 
children exposed to the shock during their first trimester of gestation. We find significant 
improvements in health at birth exclusively for boys and not for girls, driven by significant 
effects of males exposed to the shock starting with very early developmental stages (1
st
 
trimester), a decrease of 2.9 pp (49% of the mean) in the probability of low birth weight. This 
effect is particularly large for boys belonging to highly educated mothers employed in the 
public sector. We also find indications of a decreased sex-ratio at birth of about 3.3 
percentage points (6.5% of the mean) for the same sub-sample of children. Our results hold to 
a wide series of falsification and robustness tests and to mother’s fixed effects specification.  
Using complimentary datasets, we investigate the potential mechanisms through which the 
austerity measures affected health at birth and find evidence which seem to indicate that 
selection in utero due to maternal prenatal stress exposure resulted in a healthier but smaller 
cohort of boys. Unfortunately we can directly understand whether the fetal stressors are 
related to stress per se (through increase in cortisol level) and/or higher intake of alcohol or 
smoking consumption. Overall, our findings are consistent with the medical literature that has 
established that weaker males are more vulnerable to adverse conditions in utero and that 
maternal prenatal stress raises the fitness criterion of children in utero.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 depicts the Romanian context in 
which the policy change occurred, and presents the data we are using. Section 3 describes the 
empirical strategy, and presents the main results, followed by several sensitivity checks. In 
Section 4 we discuss the potential mechanisms through which an income shock may affect 
birth outcomes and further test these mechanisms in Section 5. Section 6 contains a series of 




2. Background and data 
2.1. The Romanian context 
Romania experienced sizable economic and politic insecurity throughout most of its post-
communist history.
7
 Thus, the international financial crisis that unfolded in the autumn of 
2008 was taken lightly in Romania – politicians invoked a decoupling of the Romanian 
economy from the world markets, and the public opinion was moderate in its expectations: 
the autumn 2008 Euro-barometer showed that more than half of respondents anticipated no 
change or even an improvement in the general economic situation of Romania, with the same 
attitude prevailing in the 2009 waves of the survey.
8
  
The first political signs of the recognition of the deteriorating state of the Romanian economy 
came in March 2009, when the Government initiated discussions with the IMF. After signing 
a stand-by accord in June 2009, politicians promoted the agreement as an opportunity for state 
reorganization, but subsequent proposed measures were mild and noncontroversial. Moreover, 
the political class transmitted an overall confident message in the lead-up period to the 
presidential elections of December 2009. After being re-elected, the incumbent President 
declared that "(…) we expect significant growth in the first part of 2010".9 
In this context, the President’s announcement on the national TV, on May 7th, 2010, that 
public sector wages and social security benefits would be cut was unexpected and gave rise to 
widespread social unrest and political dispute. The decision was made by the Government and 
the President after the latest round of negotiations with the IMF and was not preceded by any 
discussions in the Parliament or with social partners, nor was publicly mentioned as a 
potential policy. The measures, involving a 25% cut in wages for all public sector employees, 
the revocation of most of their financial and in-kind incentives and a 15% cut in 
unemployment, maternity leave benefits and several other social security benefits, were aimed 
at re-establishing the budgetary balance agreed to with the IMF.
10
  
                                                          
7 Although negative growth rates were replaced by high and sustained growth rates beginning in 1999, they were 
accompanied by high inflation rates and significant public deficit. In 2000, when the GDP growth rate turned positive, the 
annual inflation rate was over 40%, whereas in 2004, when the GDP annual growth rate reached a peak of almost 9%, the 
annual inflation rate was still above 10%. 
8 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/:“What are your expectations for the year to come with respect to the economic 
situation of your country (Romania).” 
9 www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/basescu-romania-nu-va-fi-afectata-de-criza-837030.html (in Romanian). Early in 2010, the 
Government adopted a graver attitude toward the worsening economic crisis as the IMF required concrete actions to reduce 
the significant budget deficit. As such, on March 16th, 2010, the Prime Minister presented in front of the Parliament the anti-
crisis measures that were being implemented, all as economic stimulus, aimed at improving  the business environment and 
reducing tax evasion. 
10 For pregnant women employed in the public sector at the time of the Austerity announcement (our treatment group), the 
income cut had a threefold effect: a monthly income drop due to the wage and benefits cut; a decrease in the annual average 
wage income which would lead to a lower (forthcoming) child care allowance, calculated as 85% of the average income 
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One month after the announcement of the austerity measures, the Finance Minister gave a 
speech pertaining to the delusional nature of the government’s previous statements on the 
economic status of the country and on the completely unexpected nature of the policy: “As a 
Finance Minister I am telling you that we could have lied six more months, we could have 
borrowed for six months, […] and could have waited six months to see what happens. The 
fact that what we are doing entails a political risk that nobody imagined a month and a half 
ago shows a complete responsibility of this Government towards the Romanian citizens”.11 
He was dismissed shortly after.  
The measures were included in a set of legislative projects drafted by the Government soon 
after the President’s announcement and forwarded to the Parliament to be adopted through a 
special procedure that circumvented the regular and lengthy law making procedures.
12
 After 
the Government assumed responsibility on the Austerity Laws, a censorship motion was 
initiated by the opposition parties in the Parliament but because of a tight majority of the 
governing coalition, the censorship motion was not adopted (though by a very close margin) 
and the Laws were passed in a slightly modified version. On June 30
th
, the President 
promulgated the laws, which came in effect July 1
st
, with an initial duration of 6 months.
13
 In 
January 2011 public sector wages were not restored to their initial level.
14
  
Overall, it is safe to assume that the austerity measures were not anticipated, in both their 
unprecedented scope and magnitude, or their timing. In our empirical strategy we will focus 
on women working in the public sector, already pregnant at the time of the austerity 
announcement, to mitigate the concern related to the change in the composition of families 
choosing to conceive. Even though the austerity measures were unanticipated, we cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
obtained over the 12 calendar months preceding the child birth; a 15% cut in the recalculated child care allowance to be 
received after birth. 
11http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-7350294-sebastian-vladescu-era-foarte-usor-mintim-continuare-mai-imprumutam-vreo-
sase-luni.htm (in Romanian) 
12 The Romanian Constitution allows, as an exception, that the Government assumes responsibility for a specific law in front 
of the Parliament, with the law under consideration being adopted by default if the Government is not dismissed in the first 3 
days by means of an adopted censorship motion. The Parliament can withdraw the trust awarded to the Government by 
adopting a censorship motion, which necessarily means that the Government is dissolved, the law proposed is not adopted 
and a new Government needs to be invested. 
13It is important to distinguish between a permanent and a temporary wage cut: transitory changes in wages have no effect on 
lifetime income or on total fertility (though they may affect the timing of fertility), while a permanent wage cut has an 
ambiguous effect (it may decrease the relative cost of children which, in turn, may increase the demand for children or, 
because of a lower income, it may decrease the demand for children; Becker [1965]; Heckman and Walker [1990]). Even if 
temporary, households might respond as though these changes are permanent if people are myopic or uncertain about the 
nature of the changes (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney [2004]). This was most likely the case in Romania, with most households 
perceiving the wage cut as permanent, because of numerous inconsistent enforcement of laws.  
14 In December 2010, the Law of Unitary Pay was adopted through Government Responsibility Assumption, which came into 
effect from January 1st, 2011, and stipulated, among others, that public sector wages will be increased by only 15% during 
2011 relative to the October 2010 levels and that no other financial or in kind incentives will be awarded.  
(Source: http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.proiect?cam=2&idp=11578, in Romanian) 
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absolutely exclude “written on the wall” effects due to the general economic situation.15 The 
possible selections into fertility will be addressed later in the paper.  
The European Commission notes a gender dimension to this type of austerity measures:
16
 
whereas men were significantly more affected in the first phase of the economic crisis when 
the private sector slowed down, the public sector wage cuts affect females significantly more 
than men due to the structure of the public sector employment. In Romania, the publicly 
employed women are concentrated in Health, Social Services and Education sectors, and had, 
even before the austerity cut, lower average wages both relative to the private sector and to 
other public, male dominated sectors.
17
 In addition, recent evidence  shows that the insecurity 
coupled with the economic crisis has worsened the perception of work-related stress in all 
European countries in general, and in Romania, already ranked high, in particular, making the 
publicly employed women the most affected by the wage cut, both in monetary and 
psychological distress terms (see Virga et al. [2012]; ESENER, [2010]). 
2.2. The impact of the austerity measures at the household level  
To understand the size of the impact of the austerity at the household level, we proceed by 
making use of the Romanian Household Budget Survey (RHBS), the main tool of assessing 
population expenditures and revenues, covering about 30,000 households/year containing 
detailed income and expenditure information at the household level. We compare here 
households with at least one publicly employed member and households with no publicly 
employed member, just before (January-July 2010) and after (August-December 2010) the 
austerity measures implementation.
18
 The results in Table 1 indicate a significant decrease in 
household wage related income of 16.7% and in total household income of about 7%.
19
 Not 
surprisingly, the wage related income drop is larger for high-educated households (about 
21.7% in column 2) because the high-educated publicly employed households were more 
likely to attract more wage related income (through bonuses, in-kinds wage related transfers) 
which were also annulled. Overall, the households affected by the shock seem to have no 
                                                          
15 At that time Romania experienced an increase in the unemployment rates in the private sector rose from a relatively stable 
level of 4 to 5% before 2009 to a peak of 8% in March 2010 [Mocanu, 2010]. 
16 Industrial Relations in Europe 2010 Report, European Commission. 
17 Source: Statistics Romania. 
18 We have attempted to trace the employed mothers with young children from the RHBS and identify them in the dataset 
based on their observable characteristics. Unfortunately there are very few such observations to provide these tests for 
households with (presumably) pregnant women employed in the public sector in 2010 vs. the previous years. The income and 
consumption data are at the household level, so our figures show, of course, a lower bound of the wage cut impact at the 
individual level. We show similar results for 2009 as a placebo test. 
19 It is not surprising that the wage drop was not 25% (or higher) as the data provides information at the household level. 
Also, we show these results only for urban households (see the explanations in the next section).   
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significant changes in food-related (column 4) or alcohol and cigarettes (column 5) 
expenditures, but significantly reduce non-food (column 6) and services expenditures (column 
7). Finally, column (8) seem to indicate that households react to the wage shock by decreasing 
the (formal) savings with about 11.9%. 
2.3. Working sample 
In our main empirical exercise we use the Vital Statistics Natality (VSN) records for years 
2007 through to 2010,
20
 as our main dataset. The VSN records cover essentially all registered 
births from the individual birth certificates, with detailed information about the newborn and 
the socio-economic characteristics of the parents, recorded at the time of the birth: (a) 
characteristics of the child: day, month and year of birth, gender, ethnicity, whether singleton 
or multiple birth, birth weight and duration of gestation in number of weeks; (b) 
characteristics of the mother: day, month and year of birth, occupational status, education, 
marital status, county and locality of residence, and mother’s fertility history: total number of 
births, number of children born alive, fetal deaths, month of first prenatal check-up and an 
indicator for home delivery; (c) characteristics of the father: day, month and year of birth and 
his occupational status.  
We restrict our sample to mothers between 16 and 45 years of age, and we exclude multiple 
births. Our initial sample size is 846,778 births over the period 2007-2010. In the baseline 
estimations, we will focus in particular on children born from mothers living in urban areas 
accounting for 465,754 of all births. Given the nature of the policy change, there are reasons 
to expect that effects would be concentrated among urban rather than rural households. 
Firstly, among the employed women (of fertile age), living in rural areas, only about 8% work 
in the public sector compared to about 30% of the employed women from urban areas 
(RHBS). Secondly, we suspect that the wage cut policy affected the rural households much 
less relative to the urban households because in Romania salary income represents less than 
20% of the total household income in rural families, compared to an average of 60% for 
families living in urban areas (Firici and Thomson [2002]).
21
 Even though our empirical 
analysis will mainly discuss urban households, we will also show that our main results hold 
                                                          
20 Starting with January 2011, Statistics Romania changed the data registration process for the VSN, and no longer collects 
information on a wide array of maternal and child characteristics which we use in the current analysis. Therefore, we cannot 
use the 2011 data.  
21 Agricultural own-production income is estimated as high as 46% for rural households and about 13% for urban households 
(Firici and Thomson, 2002). 
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when we look at all households. Summary statistics for our main variables for the urban 
mothers are found in Table 2, column block 1.
22
  
A key variable in our empirical specification is the mother’s occupational status. The VSN 
records the mother’s occupational status using the following categories: employed, 
entrepreneur, self-employed in agricultural activities, self-employed in non-agricultural 
activities, unemployed, housewife, retiree, and other situations. However, the employed 
category does not differentiate between public and private sector of employment.  
Because the policy specifically targeted the public sector employees, we proceed by making 
use of the RHBS for the 2007-2010 period. The RHBS records the occupational status for 
each household member with the same categories as the VSN except that, for the employed 
members, we also know the sector of employment, whether public or private. We start by 
estimating the simple conditional probability that an employed woman works in the public 
(vs. the private) sector using the RHBS household data. We estimate a reduced form Probit 
model separately for each year on the restricted sample of employed women aged 16 to 45, 
and include as explanatory variables all the socio-economic characteristics of mothers that are 
available in the VSN: age, region of residence, education (no schooling, primary school, 
secondary school, high school, technical college, post high-school, higher and above), 
ethnicity (Romanian, Hungarian, other), marital status, number of living children, father’s age 
and father’s occupational status (for more details see Appendix B).23 We proceed to doing 
out-of-sample predictions for the VSN dataset and obtain a predicted probability of public 
employment for each employed mother. In the last step we use the predicted probabilities to 
split the VSN sample of employed mothers into most and least likely employed in the public 
sector. To define our treatment group, we make use of information provided by the Romanian 
Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection (MLFSP) regarding the recipients of child 
care allowance.
24
 At the end of 2010, among the employed mothers receiving child care 
allowance, 20% were working in the public sector and 80% in the private sector.
25
 Thus, for 
lack of better information, we use this percentile split and treat as publicly employed, our 
                                                          
22 Appendix TableA2 in the Appendix A shows the descriptive statistics for the urban and rural sample.  
23 To check the validity of this method we conduct several robustness checks by using different samples from the RHBS: all 
employed women (no age restriction) and all employed mothers. We also use an extended specification for the probability 
estimation, in which we also include other relevant variables available in the RHBS such as type of contract or husband’s 
employment in the public sector; when we assign probabilities of public employment to mothers in the VSN, these additional 
covariates are analogous to the exclusion restrictions in an IV setting. All our results are robust to the use of these 
probabilities. Finally, we also combine all years of data, include year fixed effects, and use such prediction to create our 
distribution. Our results (available upon request) are very similar.  
24 Child care allowance is awarded to either one of the parents who has obtained any form of taxable income in the 12 months 
preceding the birth of the child. Basically all employed mothers benefit and collect this allowance.  
25 MLFSP informed us that they do not hold centralized information on the number of recipients of child care allowance by 
the child’s month, year and county of birth and mother’s sector of employment. 
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treatment group, the employed mothers with the 20% highest predicted probabilities. We will 
conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to the choice of the threshold percentile and the 
assignment into the treatment group. 
The main characteristics of the publicly employed mothers (as defined by the 20-80 split) are 
shown in Table 2, column block 2. Compared to the sample of all employed mothers, shown 
in column block 3, the publicly employed mothers are, on average, older, more likely to be 
married and more educated. Reassuringly, this composition matches very well the RHBS 
data.
26
 Relative to all mothers or to all employed mothers, the publicly employed mothers 
seem to have healthier children as measured by birth weight and gestation length. In column 
block 4 we show the main characteristics of the housewives mothers, accounting for about 
30% of all mothers in urban area.
27
 Housewives mothers are, on average, younger, less likely 
to be married, lower educated and have children with worse outcomes at birth relative to 
mothers in column blocks 1 to 3. 
At this stage we check possible anticipatory effects of the austerity measures. Overall, from 
Table 2 we observe that employed mothers who give birth later years seem to be better 
educated (more likely to have higher education) which may due to a positive selection into 
motherhood, but also because a well-recognised trend in education in Romania.
28
 The 
publicly employed mothers, even though are on average more educated compared to the other 
occupational categories, in 2010 (relative to 2009 and before) they are less likely to have a 
higher degree and more likely to only have a post-high school degree, suggesting a negative 
selection.  
To address the issue more formally, in Table 3, for each occupational category we run 
regressions with mothers’ observable characteristics as outcomes. Overall, mothers pregnant 
on May 7
th
, 2010  are more likely to be more educated and slightly older. This is also true for 
the housewives and particularly for the privately employed mother. The effects are significant 
                                                          
26 Albeit a small sample, among the 230 mothers (with a child one year old or less between 2007 and 2010) employed in the 
public sector, 77% have high education, while only 6% have secondary education. Among the employed women in the 
private sector who have recently become mothers (1,102), only 30% have higher education, and 40% have high-school 
education and 22% have secondary education. This matches very well with the composition we obtain in our treatment group 
based on the 80-20 split. 
27 The occupational structure of all the mothers reveals that 47.8% of all women (urban and rural) giving birth in 2010 are 
employed; 42.6%, housewives; 0.15%, business-owners; 1%, self-employed in non-agricultural activities; 0.2%, self-
employed in agriculture; 1.8%, unemployed; 0.2%, pensioners; and 6.25%, other situations. This structure is quite stable over 
the years and the area of residence.  
28 See Appendix A, Figure A1.  The significant increase in the number of higher educated individuals is due to the massive 
increase in the number of private universities.  Figure A2 shows that over the 2003-2010 period, while the proportion of 
employed mothers with primary education is relatively constant across years, there is an increase in the employed mothers 
with higher education matching the decrease of the employed mothers with secondary education.  
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and quite large as a percentage change from the mean. However, publicly employed women 
pregnant at the time of the announcement seem to be less educated (more have only secondary 
or high school and fewer have a higher education) and they are less likely to be married. 
Albeit they are statistically significant, the changes relative to the mean are not as large as for 
the privately employed or for the housewives mothers.
29
 Overall, our results tend to show 
that, even though the austerity measures were most likely unanticipated, the overall economic 
context has influenced the fertility timing decision of Romanian women and has altered the 
composition of mothers becoming pregnant. These findings are in line with other studies (see 
Dehejia and Lleras-Muney [2004] for the US) that show that in turbulent economic times, we 
may observe an increase fertility of low-skilled women (as measured by education) and a 
negative selection for the high-skilled ones.
30
 However, it is important to note that due to our 
difference in difference specification, a negative selection in the treatment group and a slight 
positive selection in the control group would bias the results towards zero and thus the results 
would not be driven by this selection.   
3. Identification and main results 
3.1. Identification strategy  
To test whether the aforementioned austerity measures changed the outcomes at birth of the 
children in utero at the time of the announcement (May 7
th
, 2010) relative to children 
conceived in earlier years, we rely on a difference-in-difference (DD) specification. Our 
treatment group consists of pregnant women working in the public sector while our control 
group consists of pregnant housewives
31
. Thus, we compare outcomes at birth between 
children in utero on May 7
th
, 2010, and May 7
th
, before (2009-2007), with mothers working in 
the public sector and housewives. Housewife mothers as our preferred control group as they 
are least likely to have been affected by the austerity measures, as they are neither engaged in 
any income generating activity nor actively searching for employment. Moreover, they are the 
second most numerous group by mothers’ occupational status, after employed mothers. 
                                                          
29 An alternative way to analyze the selection into fertility issue is to estimate difference in difference regressions comparing 
the characteristics of the publicly employed mothers with those of the housewife mothers, pregnant at the time of the 
austerity measures announcement relative to the same period in previous years. In accordance with the previous findings, we 
find that relative to housewife mothers, publicly employed mothers from urban areas are less educated (lower probability to 
have higher degree and higher probability to have secondary education), younger, less likely to be married or have an 
employed husband, and are less likely to give birth to their first child. The results are presented in Appendix Table A3. 
30 The net effect of an economic shock is theoretically ambiguous and hinges upon the mother’s skill depreciation rate and on 
whether capital markets are perfect (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney [2004]). One may hypothesize that low-skilled women are 
less likely to have a human capital that depreciates during a temporary absence from a job during pregnancy and after birth 
(and assuming that capital markets are perfect); if so, then in low-wage periods, we may observe an increase fertility of low-
skilled women. 
31 Housewife is defined (in VSN) as a person engaged in domestic work such as preparing food, maintenance and home care, 
domestic industry activities not intended for sale, care and education of children and who does not receive any formal income 
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Housewives may not be an ideal control group and, even though we use a large set of 
individual controls, these may not completely adjust for all (unobservable) differences. Thus 
we will also consider the privately employed mothers as an alternative control group. 
Privately employed mothers are not our preferred control group because they are also defined 
based on our 20-80 split. Additionally, we have shown in the previous section a substantial 
(positive) change in the composition of privately employed women who become pregnant in 
2010 which, most likely, will bias our results towards zero. 
We measure health birth using the low birth weight indicator, defined as a birth weight less 
than 2,500 grams.
32
 Our baseline specification, estimated through ordinary least squares, is 
the following: 
                                                
                              
(1) 
where i indexes a child born in month m by a mother living in county r in year t;          is 
an indicator that equals 1 if the mother of child i works in the public sector and 0 if she is a 
housewife (or works in the private sector in an alternative specification). Our key coefficient 
is   , on the interaction between Public and an indicator whether the child was in utero in 
May 7
th
 2010. This measures the change in outcomes after the 2010 announcement relative to 
earlier years, among women that work in the public sector relative to housewives.    are year 
indicators that equals 1 if child i was in utero on May 7
th
 in year t;    is a vector of control 
variables for maternal and child characteristics: child’s gender, mother’s age at birth and its 
square, mother’s education, ethnicity, marital status, child’s parity, number of children alive, 
indicator for prenatal control, gestation month of the first gynaecological visit in the current 
pregnancy and an indicator for home delivery. Our main specifications also include the 
father’s age and its square together with indicators for his employment status (whether 
employed, entrepreneur, self-employed in agricultural activities, self-employed in non-
agricultural activities, unemployed, retiree or other situations) at the time of the child birth.
33
 
   are 42 county indicators, while     are county specific trends;    are months of birth 
indicators; with     , we control for the female unemployment rate in the month of conception 
                                                          
32 We also used continuous birth weight as an outcome and main results are fairly similar. However, we focus on the low 
birth weight indicator since it is a more accurate measure of neonatal health and a better predictor for infant health, being the 
leading cause of neonatal and infant mortality (Stein et al [2006]). 
33 Information for the fathers is available regardless of the mother’s marital status. However, it is missing for about 23 
percent of the unmarried mothers. For this sample, albeit very small, we have imputed the missing information with the 
relevant locality average. Our results are not sensitive to including or not this sample. 
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for each county and year of conception.
34
 We cluster the standard errors at the county level 
(42 clusters). 
The key identification assumption in a DD framework is that, absent the policy change, we 
would not observe any difference in our outcomes between publicly employed mothers and 
housewives in 2010 relative to earlier years (the parallel trend assumption). To examine the 
plausibility of this assumption we will add two interaction terms to the baseline model (1): the 
Public indicator interacted with year indicators Utero2008 and Utero2009. A graphical 
validation is presented in Appendix A, Figure A3. 
Because the literature suggests that the effects of in utero shocks may vary according to the 
stages of gestation, we will explore the fact that at the time of the shock children were in 
different gestational stages. The VSN data contains the gestational age in number of weeks at 
birth and we are able to infer the gestational age at the date of the austerity announcement.
35
 
Using this information, we split our sample into the following categories: (1) children in the 
1
st 
trimester of gestation (up to 12 weeks); (2) children in the 2
nd 
trimester (13-24 weeks); (3) 
children in the 3
rd 
trimester of gestation (more than 25 weeks) at May 7
th
, 2010. Finally, 
because medical research established that effects of in utero conditions may depend on the 
gender of the fetus, we will also show our results separately for boys and girls.  
We note that we define treatment status according to mother’s occupation. However, indirect 
shocks may also occur due to fathers employed in the public sector. We address this issue in 
Section 6.  
3.2. Results  
Main estimates  
This section presents the baseline results from Equation 1 for the low birth weight indicator. 
Table 4 shows the results for the urban households from the DD estimation for the boys and 
girls (Panel A) and separately for boys (Panel B) and girls (Panel C).
36
 Each three columns of 




 and, respectively, 
3
rd
  trimester of gestation at the moment of the austerity shock. For each trimester, we first 
                                                          
34 Unfortunately, the VSN does not include information on mothers drinking or smoking habits. Including controls for the 
average expenditures on cigarettes and alcohol, at the county level, for each year and gestational month c from conception to 
birth does not change our results. Same if when we included the average consumption expenditures on food at the county 
level for each gestational month from conception to birth. Results available. 
35 Having the gestational age in weeks at the time of the announcement allows us to circumvent the problem of comparing 
children born in the same month but who were in different developmental stages at the time of the announcement due to 
different lengths of gestation. 
36 Appendix Table A4 shows the results we also include rural households. The results are very much in line with the urban 
sample, slightly lower in magnitude and significant at a lower level.  
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show our main coefficient of interest, the interaction term PublicxUtero2010, from a basic 
specification controlling only for year and county indicators, and county specific trends;
37
 
next we add our controls;  finally, we show the estimated coefficients from the fully interacted 
model, conditional on pre-treatment dynamics.  
Panel A shows that the austerity measures affected only children in their 1
st
 trimester of 
gestation. The impact of the shock in columns (1)-(2) is negative and significant suggesting 
an improvement of the low birth weight incidence by 2 percentage points (29% of the mean). 
This may be surprising as these children were exposed to the shock in utero the longest, 
starting with the very early developmental stages. The magnitude is smaller in column (3) 
after we control for pre-treatment dynamics. The estimates for the 2009 and 2008 year-
specific public indicators are positive and not significantly different from zero suggesting that 
children born from the publicly employed and housewives mothers do not differ significantly 
in their evolution of the low birth weight outcome during the pre-treatment years, thus 





of gestation show a similar pattern, but the magnitude of our main coefficient of interest is 
much smaller and it is never significant.  
The results in Panel B indicate a significant decrease of the low birth weight indicator for the 
sample of boys in utero in the 1
st
 trimester on May 7
th
, 2010; this effect is stable across the 
columns, of 3.2 percentage points in columns (1)-(2) and 2.9 percentage points in column (3) 
(49% mean).
38
 This apparent positive effect holds even though we have shown in the previous 
section a negative selection among publicly employed mothers in 2010 (relative to before and 
also to the other occupational categories), which would render our results as lower bounds of 




 trimesters of gestation indicate qualitatively 
similar results but much smaller in magnitude and not significant. Finally, the results for girls, 
in Panel C show no effect of the shock on the low birth weight indicator.
 
 
In order to gain a better understanding about the effects at different gestational ages at the 
time of the shock, we use a moving window approach in which we “glide” the treatment over 
cohorts defined in 12 weeks periods, instead of trimesters, at May 7
th
. Figure 1 presents the 
estimated coefficient of interest for each of the 12 weeks intervals, for all the three samples of 
interest (all, boys and girls), together with the corresponding standard errors. For the sample 
                                                          
37  Our results are not sensitive to excluding the county specific trends. 
38 Including all controls in columns (2) and (3) and keeping in mind that a large share of the publicly employed mothers have 
high education, the Public dummy will also actually capture the high education dummy. If we exclude the tertiary education 
among the controls, the Public indicator becomes significant (with a similar magnitude as in column (1)) and the interaction 
Public*Utero2010 does not change sign, magnitude or significance.  
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of boys, the effects are decreasing in absolute value and remain significant up until the cohort 
who was 11 to 23 weeks at May 7
th
, which indicates that children in early second trimester 
were also affected. For girls, the only significant impacts, in the same direction as for the 
boys, are observed for girls who were between 14-26 up to 17-29 weeks. Overall, boys appear 
significantly more affected, both in intensity and in number of children affected, with the 
results indicating a significant decrease of the probability of low birth weight. 
Sensitivity analysis 
Before we discuss the possible mechanisms in place, we subject our first results to a series of 
tests to check their robustness. The main concerns will address the definition of our treatment 
group and the composition of the control group.  
      a)The treatment group: Sensitivity to definition of treatment group 
So far, given the limited information provided by the Romanian MLFSP, we have used the 
20-80 percentile split of the probabilities of a mother’s employment to define our treatment. 
To check the sensitivity of the low birth weight indicator with respect to this split, we allow 
for different definitions of the treatment group based on varying the threshold percentile from 
the 80
th
 to the 50
th
 (i.e., employed mothers with predicted probabilities above the threshold 
percentile are included in the treatment group). Figure 2 confirms that our results, especially 
for the boys in the 1
st
 trimester of gestation at the time of the shock, are not sensitive to 
different thresholds though and remain negative and significant at 5%, but increasingly biased 
towards 0 as we misclassify the treatment and include more privately employed mothers.  
      b) Are the treatment and control groups similar enough?  
One possible concern is that housewives mothers are not an ideal control group to the 
employed mothers as they may react differently to different shocks and the rich controls 
included in our regressions may not totally adjust for all differences. We address this issue in 
several ways. 
First, because publicly employed mothers have a high educational level, and that recent 
evidence seems to indicate that economic shocks on pregnant women may have a different 
impact according to the mother’s SES (see Bozzoli and Quintana-Domeque [2013]), we 
compare only mothers (public and housewives) with high education (high school and above). 
Our results, presented in Table 5, show that the improvement of the low birth weight indicator 
we uncovered earlier is driven by the boys belonging to highly educated mothers.
 39
 However, 
                                                          
39Additionally, we have also used a simple matching strategy (nearest neighborhood and 1-to-1 matching, no replacement) 
based on pre-treatment characteristics. The low birth weight indicator is quite similar to our baseline estimates, even though 
less precisely estimated. Results available upon request. 
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we cannot do the same comparison for low educated mothers because of an extremely low 
share of low educated mothers in the treated group (<1%). 
Secondly, we use as an alternative control group the privately employed mothers defined as 
mothers with the predicted probabilities below the 80
th
 percentile, while keeping the same 
definition as in the main specification for the publicly employed mothers. Reassuringly, the 
results in Table 6 have a similar pattern as our main outcomes in Table 4, especially for the 
children in the 1
st
 trimester at the time of the shock, but they are smaller magnitude given the 




4. Exploring the underlying mechanisms 
In this section we attempt to explain our seemingly counterintuitive results by investigating 
the potential mechanisms in place. There are three main mechanisms through which an 
income shock generated by an unexpected cut in a pregnant woman’s wage may affect 
children’s outcomes at birth: (1) selection into motherhood, (2) nutrition and prenatal care, 
and (3) prenatal maternal stress.  
4.1. Selection into fertility and abortions  
In this paper, we try to mitigate some concerns related to changes in the composition of 
pregnant publicly employed women by using the fact that the Romanian austerity measures 
were unexpected, and by looking at the sample of already pregnant mothers at the time of the 
announcement. We have shown in Section 2 that some selection into fertility occurred prior to 
the announcement because of the overall economic situation but, given the nature of the 
selection, the size and direction of these selections do not invalidate our main results. 
Also, already pregnant women may react to the austerity measures by terminating their 
pregnancy using abortion. Abortion in Romania is available up to 12 gestational weeks. 
Although we do not have individual data on abortion procedures, we investigate whether the 
quarterly aggregate number of abortions increased significantly after the wage cut 
announcement.
41
 Reassuringly, we find no significant increase in the total number of 
abortions, but we must acknowledge that the abortion data is not available by women’s 
employment status.   
                                                          
40We have also conducted a falsification test where we compare our control groups: the privately employed vs. the 
housewives mothers. The results (available) show no significant differences between these two groups for the low birth 
weight indicators. 
41 We use data from the Romanian Ministry of Health and estimate a panel fixed effects model in which our dependent 
variable is county-by-quarter number of abortions and control for county time trends, seasonality and a dummy indicating 
post-announcement quarters, quarter 3 and quarter 4 in 2010. The results are available. 
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Because our main findings concern only boys in utero, one may worry that sex selective 
abortion could potentially alter our results. While we are not aware of any evidence on gender 
preferences in Romania, one way to formally address this concern is to examine the pattern of 
sex-ratio for different child parities over time. In cultures with sex preferences, sex-ratios are 
usually normal at first parity but may change with parity (Almond et al. [2009]). Using the 
VSN data we find no indication of sex-selection across years or across occupational 
categories. Finally, our results on low birth weight hold for a parity larger than 2. Moreover, 
in Romania the child’s gender cannot be detected before 18 gestational weeks using routine 
investigations whereas abortion is permitted until the 12
th
 week of gestation, which makes 
gender-based selective abortion, in most cases, impossible.  
4.2. Nutrition and prenatal care 
Prenatal nutrition 
A reduced disposable income may lower the quantity or the quality of food intake of the 
mother which, in turn, may lead to an insufficient nutritional supply to the fetus. Such 
nutritional restrictions may adversely affect the fetal development, and are often reflected in a 
higher incidence of low birth weight, preterm delivery and perinatal morbidity (Gluckman 
and Hanson [2005]; Abrams et al. [2000], Fowels [2004]).
42
 Importantly, insufficient caloric 
intake seems to result in a lower birth weight only in late pregnancy, during  the 3
rd 
trimester 
(Stephenson and Symonds [2002]); boys seem, on average, more vulnerable to food shortages 
than girls (Eriksson et al. [2009]). Almond et al. [2011] show that, in the US, pregnancies 
exposed to the Food Stamp Program three months before birth resulted in an increased birth 
weight. Bozzoli and Quintana-Domeque [2013] find worsening health outcomes at birth for 
children exposed in the 3
rd
 trimester to negative economic fluctuations in Argentina, and only 
for children of low educated mothers who were likely credit constrained. Yet, Almond and 
Mazumer [2011] look at relatively mild forms of nutritional disruptions imposed by Ramadan 
daylight fasting during pregnancy and find a negative impact on birth weights, but only for 
children exposed during the first two trimesters of pregnancy. 
From this evidence, it is safe to conclude that possible nutritional restrictions suffered by the 
fetus would lead to worsening (or unchanged) weight at birth, whereas we find improvements 
in birth weight.  Additionally, we show in Table 1, column (4) that there were no significant 
                                                          
42 Nutritional restrictions during the prenatal period are not necessarily reflected in lower birth weights: for example, 
individuals exposed in utero in early gestation to the Dutch famine did not present lower birth weights but higher rate of 
incidence of coronary heart diseases, diabetes and obesity as compared to non-exposed individuals (Painter et al. [2005]; 
Roseboom et al. [2001]). 
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change in foodstuff expenditures following the wage cuts. Overall, we may safely conclude 
that the nutrition channel is not consistent with by our results. 
Health damaging goods 
A decrease in household income may also induce a reduction in the consumption of health-
damaging goods, such as cigarettes and alcohol, and medical literature shows that maternal 
smoking or alcohol consumption during pregnancy correlate with the increased risk of 
miscarriage and low birth weight (Floyd et al. [1993]). Ruhm and Black [2002] and Ruhm 
[2003] show that health-related behavioural improvements, in the form of decreased 
consumption of alcohol and cigarettes, have a counter-cyclical pattern and the average health 
level improves during recessions. Dehejia and Lleras-Muney [2004] find significant 
improvements in infant health outcomes at birth due to changes in individual behaviour of 
white mothers who significantly reduced smoking and alcohol consumption during 
pregnancy. These behavioural improvements were sufficiently strong to offset the 
simultaneous negative selection into motherhood.  
Unfortunately, information on mothers smoking or drinking habits is not included in the VSN. 
Evidence from RHBS in Table 1 shows no change in alcohol and cigarettes expenditures per 
capita induced by the austerity measures. Of course, these expenditures reflect the behaviour 
of the average individual/households and not pregnant women.  
Even if behavioural improvements did occur, we observe significant changes for boys only, in 
their 1
st
 trimester of pregnancy  (from high-SES mothers, presumably well informed) and, to 
our knowledge, it has not been determined that boys would benefit more than females from 
behavioural improvements (in early gestation). We argue the behavioural improvements of 
pregnant mothers is not likely to be the main channel through which the austerity measures 
influenced health at birth, though we can certainly not dismiss its role.  
Instead, Nilsson (2013) finds that boys exposed early in utero to an increase in the availability 
of alcohol in Sweden were the most negatively affected at birth as measured by a reduced 
share of males, which indicates that boys highly exposed to alcohol were more likely to be 
spontaneously aborted. If pregnant women reacted to the austerity-induced shock by 
increasing alcohol intake (especially before pregnancy recognition), we may also explain our 
results through increased spontaneous abortions of the weakest male fetuses. We will verify 






A decrease in wage may also lower the opportunity cost of leisure and health-improving 
activities (bed rest in high-risk pregnancies), and may induce a shift in the labour supply of 
pregnant women from full- to part-time employment. The reduction in working hours would 
allow for increased prenatal care and would positively influence children’s outcomes at birth 
(Clapp et. al [2000]). This behaviour is unlikely due to the rigidity of the public sector 
employment in Romania and the very limited opportunities of part time public employment in 






Finally, a wage cut may potentially restrict the antenatal medical supervision by lowering the 
number of prenatal medical visits. However, in Romania, prenatal care is free of charge and is 
available to all pregnant women irrespective of their employment status.  
4.3. Prenatal stress 
An unexpected and significant economic shock may induce psychological distress due to the 
financial insecurity it entails. Indeed, 2010 survey evidence indicates a higher stress, 
particularly related to inadequate wages, among the staff in the public vs. the private 
Romanian sector (Spielberger et al. [2010]). The psychological stress caused by the austerity  
shock experienced by the pregnant women may influence the fetal development through 
higher levels of cortisol, a stress hormone that reaches the fetus.
45
 The exposure to high 
cortisol levels induces structural adaptations in order to accelerate the maturation of the fetus 
and ensure her survival in a predicted stressful environment,
46
 but also to modify her ulterior 
response to stress (Gluckman and Hanson [2005]). Though these predictive adaptive 
                                                          
43 At the same time, women employed in the public sector could have reacted to the significant wage cut by an increased rate 
of absenteeism, thus increasing their leisure time. The RHBS information on absenteeism does not reveal any significant 
differences between 2010 and 2009-2007 for women employed in the public sector. Another related, but inapplicable 
concern, is pregnant women changing occupational status or sector of employment after the wage cut. From the RHBS we 
see a very high degree of persistence in the occupational status, with approx. 99% women having the same occupational 
status as in the last 12 months (both for employed and housewife mothers); moreover, there is no significant change before 
and after the wage cut announcement in the share of housewives that used to be employed in the prior 12 months. Regarding 
the change in sector of employment, it is unlikely given that i) even after the wage cut, the average public sector wages 
remained higher than private sector wages, ii) the unemployment rates in the public sector were high and rising and iii) 
employment rates in the public sector were stable over the entire period.  
44 We also check if women who were on the margin of leaving the labor force due to, for instance, a problematic or a first-
child pregnancy (or both), are more likely to exit the labor force and become housewives when the wage cut occurs. We test 
whether the number of housewife mothers significantly changes in 2010 for the first born children and for births that signal a 
problematic pregnancy: very preterm birth (before the 32nd gestational week) and very low birth weight (a birth weight less 
than 1,500 grams) and find no such effect. 
45 It is important to clarify that in our experiment, during the first 3 months following the May 2010 announcement, mothers-
to-be were exposed to stress, and only starting August 2010, they were exposed to both stress and a reduced income. This is 
because the de-facto wage cut occurred in early August 2010, when public employees received the wages for July 2010.  
46  E.g., changes in the density of glucocorticoid receptors in the neural network and changes in the responsiveness of the 
HPA (hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal) axis (Gluckman and Hanson [2005]). 
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responses are not necessarily reflected in birth outcomes (but may manifest later), numerous 
medical studies have identified a direct link between prenatal stress exposure and increased 
incidence of preterm delivery and low birth weight or increased risk of a miscarriage (see 
Mulder et al. [2002], Maconochie et al [2007], Beydoun and Saftlas [2008] for comprehensive 
reviews).  
In addition to the medical literature, there is a growing interest among economists to quantify 
the effects of maternal stress on infant birth outcomes by exploiting natural experiments in 
which stress is generated by exogenous, albeit rare and violent, events. The evidence shows 
that early pregnancy exposure to stress is more likely to harm a child’s outcome at birth. 
Camacho [2008] finds a negative impact of stress induced by landmine explosions on infant 
birth weight when exposure occurs during the 1
st
 trimester of the pregnancy, while Mansour 
and Rees [2012] identify a causal relationship between the number of fatalities in an armed 
conflict that occur during the 1
st
 trimester of pregnancy and increased probability of low birth 
weight.
47
 Bozzoli & Quintana-Domeque [2013] find increased low birth weight incidence due 
to negative macroeconomic fluctuations for children in the 1
st
 trimester which they attribute to 
maternal stress, occurring both to high and low educated mothers.  
Selection in utero? 
Previously presented evidence suggests that prenatal stress scars survivors, leading to worse 
health outcomes at birth. However, prenatal maternal stress could also lead to improved 
average health outcomes at birth by means of a natural selection mechanism, whereby 
prenatal maternal stress raises the fitness criterion required to avoid spontaneous abortion. In 
particular, the theory of selection in utero hypothesises that weaker fetuses are spontaneously 
aborted because of significant maternal stress, and that the weak male fetuses are being 
aborted more often than weak female fetuses. Trivers and Willard’s [1973] hypothesis 
postulates that the selection mechanism preponderantly selects against weaker male fetuses, 
as the likelihood of reproductive success of a weak male is relatively lower than that of a 
weak female. An alternative explanation for the more frequent miscarriage of males relative 
to females is related to males’ more rapid growth rate during early pregnancy, which makes 
males more predisposed to abnormalities than female fetuses and thus more exposed to risk of 
spontaneous abortion. Medical evidence indicates that selection in utero affects fetuses in 
                                                          
47 On the other hand, Aizer et al. [2009] use cortisol levels during pregnancy in a mother fixed effects strategy and find no 




their early developmental stages (Hobel et al. [1999], Owen and Mathews [2003], Catalano et 
al [2009]).  
The selective mortality mechanism is reflected in a decrease of the sex-ratio at birth and in the 
improvement of the average health level for the male cohort exposed in utero to the stressor. 
Catalano et al. [2012] find an inverse relationship between maternal cortisol levels during 
pregnancy and male cohort size and conclude that elevated maternal stress culls cohorts by 
“raising the fitness criterion”, thus resulting in healthier males. Catalano et al. [2009] show 
that mass layoffs predict lower secondary sex ratios as a consequence of significant maternal 
stress during pregnancy due to adverse economic conditions that preponderantly selects 
against weak male fetuses.  Sanders and Stocker [2011] show that gender ratios at birth can be 
used to infer fetal death rates of males, which are more vulnerable to maternal stress. Valente 
[2011] finds evidence of selection in utero due to maternal conflict exposure. 
Our results so far indicate significant improvements in health at birth of male cohorts exposed 
to the shock in early gestation. In the next section we proceed to check whether selection in 
utero is our mechanism in place.  
5. Exploring further the main mechanism: selection in-utero?  
The evidence from Section 4 seems to indicate that selection in utero, caused by in-utero 
maternal stress and/or increased alcohol intake, may explain our apparent positive effect on 
birth weight. Because we do not have data on miscarriages, a common problem in the 
literature, we proceed to examine the effects on the secondary sex-ratio.  
Sex-ratio at birth 
Similar to other studies with individual level data, we model the sex-ratio at birth as the 
probability of a male birth. Panel A of Table 7 presents the results of the DD estimation for 
the probability of a live birth being a male, using a similar framework as before, while Panel 
B show results for the high educated mothers. The overall effect on the probability of a child 
being a boy, in Panel A, for the children who were in the 1
st
 trimester of gestation at the time 
of the shock is negative and significant in columns (1) and (2) with a magnitude of about 3.3 
percentage points (6,5 % of the mean), and marginally significant (p-value=0.105) in column 
(3), when we include the pre-treatment dynamics. This effect seems to be driven by the high-
educated mothers (in Panel B), who were 4.5 percentage points less likely to have a boy if 
they were in their 1
st
  trimester at the time of the shock.  
Figure 3 presents the sensitivity of the results on the probability of a male birth to the 
definition of the treatment group, analogue to Figure 2. For children who were in the first 
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trimester at the time of the announcement, the results remain significant at the 10% 
significance level for all definitions of the treatment group (ranging from above 80
th
 
percentile to above the median of the predicted probability of public employment). 
Additionally, we have also checked the robustness of these results when using the privately 
employed mothers as an alternative control group. The results (shown in Appendix A, Table 
A4) are not statistically significant and they are much lower in magnitude.
48
  
To summarize, for the children who were in the 1
st
 trimester of gestation at the time of the 
policy change announcement, i.e., the most exposed to the shock, we find improvements in 
the health at birth outcomes for males but not for females and a reduced probability of a male 
birth. These results are driven by the effects on the children of highly educated publicly 
employed mothers. This evidence fits the selection in utero hypothesis, which postulates that 
significant maternal prenatal stress causes weaker males to be spontaneously aborted in early 
pregnancy. As such, in the light of the three main potential mechanisms through which the 
austerity measures could affect health at birth outcomes, we conclude that the effects we 
observe are largely (while maybe not entirely) caused prenatal maternal stress, via selection in 
utero.  
The fact that we find no significant effect for girls may imply that girls are substantially more 
robust. Another possibility is that lower-tail boys are weaker than lower-tail females, but the 
median boy is stronger than the median girl, such that the effects on both the tail and the 
median of the female birth weight distribution leads to an insignificant effect for girls.  
6.  Further sensitivity checks 
Finally, we attempt to address two concerns that may potentially bias our results, one related 
to the mothers’ unobservable characteristics and one concerning possible indirect effects at 
the household level through fathers working in the public sector. Overall, the results using 
these specifications point in the same direction as our main results. 
 
6.1. Mothers’ fixed effects  
One concern is that mothers may have different unobserved characteristics correlated with 
their stress response that may affect their behaviour and could, in turn, lead to an 
                                                          
48 We also looked whether we find a smaller cohort size for males in utero in 2010 vs. 2009 and before. We calculate the 
cohort size at locality level by gender and gestational stage at the time of the austerity measures announcement, for publicly 
employed and housewife mothers (about 998 clusters). Next, we simply compare the log(boys) for the publicly employed 
mothers, separately for each trimester and the effect for the 1st trimester is negative and significant [-0.188*(0.100)], while 
for the 2nd and 3rd is not significant[-0.034(0.096) and 0.084(0.108)]. When we consider the housewives sample the effects 
are, for each trimester, respectively: -0.016(0.056); -0.072*(0.036); 0.019(0.041). The effects for girls for the publicly 
employed are also negative and similar in magnitude as those for boys but not significant.  
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improvement in the health at birth of their child (Aizer et al. [2009]). One way to control for 
these unobservable differences and other time invariant omitted variables is to use mother 
fixed effects and compare the children in utero on May 7
th
, 2010, to their elder siblings. 
To construct the sibling sample we first select all employed and housewives mothers from the 
2010 VSN that report having at least one more child. Next, we make use of the 2003-2009 
VSN files in an attempt to construct the siblings’ sample.49 Unfortunately, Statistics Romania 
did not provide us the mothers’ personal number and we cannot directly link the data but we 
do have information on the mother’s place of residence, mother’s ethnicity and the mother’s 
exact date of birth (day, month and year). To increase the precision of our matching, we 
further restrict our sample to children belonging to mothers married to the same fathers, by 
exploiting the fact that the VSN provides information on the exact date of marriage (based on 
the marital certificate) and the father’s birth date (day, month and year). Thus, we obtain a 
selected sample of 60,931 children belonging to 25,392 mothers.  
In Table 8 our main variables of interest is the exposed sibling indicator, which equals 1 if the 
child was in utero on May 7
th
, 2010 and 0 if the child was an elder sibling, for the selected 
sample of married mothers, to the same father and having at least two children in 2010, who 
are either publicly employed (columns 1-3), or housewives (columns 4-6). In Panel A we look 
at the low birth weight outcome and in Panel B at the probability of the youngest child to be a 
boy.
50
 Our controls include child-specific characteristics, the age of parents at conception, and 
a linear (or quadratic) time trend to control for other changes that may allow mother’s 
behaviour to adapt to e.g., health or education trends.
51
 The first two columns for each 
occupational category are sibling DD estimates, and the third column is the mother FE 
specification. For the publicly employed mothers (columns 1-3), the results are quite stable 
and indicate that the siblings who were exposed to the austerity shock in utero seem less 
likely to have a low birth weight compared to their unexposed siblings (Panel A); however, 
we find no effect on the probability of the exposed child to be a boy (Panel B). For the 
housewives mothers, the results in columns (1) and (2), Panel A indicate also an improvement 
in the low birth weight indicator (albeit smaller in magnitude than for the public mothers), but 
the result turn out smaller and not significant once we include family fixed effects indicators.  
                                                          
49The reason for not using data collected before 2003 is that the structure of the VSN files has been changed in 2003, and 
several important socio-economic characteristics of the parents are not available in earlier records.  
50 Here we show the results for the occupational status (whether employed or housewives) in 2010, but the results are similar 
if we restrict the sample to always employed and always housewives. 
51Additionally, to control for possible changes in education over time within the same household, we also include the level of 
education and the occupational status of the parents at the time of each birth. The results remain robust to this specification.  
While the results hold the expected sign, we do not find significant results when we restrict the sample same-sex siblings. 
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6.2. Income shocks through father’s employment status  
Finally, the employment sector of the father may also influence the (intensity of the) 
perceived shock. Our prior is that households may have been more severely affected by the 
policy if both parents were employed in the public sector. According to data in RHBS, about 
30% of publicly employed women and only 8% of housewife women are married to a 
publicly employed man. Unfortunately, from the VSN, we do not have information on the 
sector of employment of the employed fathers, and neither do we have the other covariates 
which would allow us to proceed in an analogue manner to mothers and obtain their predicted 
probabilities of public employment. Thus, we compare households with publicly employed 
mothers with employed fathers vs. households with housewives and fathers with an 
occupational status other than employed, e.g. business owner, self-employed in agriculture. 
The estimation results, presented in Table 9 for the low birth weight indicator and Table 10 
for the probability of a male birth, suggest that our main specification is not biased by indirect 
shocks. Thus, we may argue that controlling for husband’s occupational status in the regular 
fashion is sufficient to capture the household level shocks. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The present study shows that prenatal exposure to economic shocks can influence the birth 
outcomes of the in utero cohorts. Using a major and unexpected wage cut policy that affected 
all public sector employees in Romania in 2010, we investigate the effects of negative income 
shocks on outcomes at birth. Our results suggest that economic shocks may lead to selection 
in utero, in which maternal exposure to significant fetal stressors (e.g., stress, alcohol 
consumption) selects against frail fetuses, with male fetuses significantly more predisposed to 
spontaneous abortions than females. We infer this “culling” process after detecting significant 
improvements in health outcomes at birth in the male cohorts exposed to the stressor early in 
gestation, coupled with evidence of a reduced sex-ratio at birth for the cohort that was in the 
1
st
 trimester of gestation at the time of the announcement and a reduced size of that particular 
male cohort.  
From a policy perspective, it is important to understand the mechanisms through which such 
income shocks affect unborn children. If prenatal nutrition, prenatal care or selective 
abortions would be the main mechanism in place, policymakers could potentially reverse the 
effect through programs such as food stamps. However, if the main mechanism is the one 
which we seem to identify, mainly a biological response to severe stressors, then there is less 
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scope for reversing the policy impact, and this needs to be taken into consideration when such 
drastic measures are implemented.   
Our findings suggest that unexpected policy changes, albeit temporary, may act as sufficiently 
severe stressors on the population to such an extent that selective fetal mortality may has large 
effects, even in developed economies where the baseline health is relatively high. Given the 
medical evidence on the latent effects of prenatal exposure to stressors, if these apparently 
healthier children were “culled” through such a mechanism, they may show adverse outcomes 
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Figure 2. Sensitivity to the definition of the treatment group, Low birth weight: the figure shows the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval for the parameter of interest, the 
PublicxUtero2010 interaction term as we vary the threshold percentile of the predicted probability 
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Figure 3. Sensitivity to the definition of the treatment group, Probability of a male birth outcome: the figure shows the point estimates and the 95% confidence interval for the parameter 




Table 1. Household income and expenditures pattern 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




























Panel A: 2010      
Public*after -0.167* -0.217** -0.070*** -0.017 -0.043 -0.062** -0.051* -0.119** 
 (0.095) (0.104) (0.022) (0.018) (0.080) (0.030) (0.028) (0.057) 
after 0.077 0.159 0.013 0.219*** 0.508*** 0.138*** -0.106*** -0.011 
 (0.095) (0.131) (0.019) (0.020) (0.071) (0.038) (0.025) (0.032) 
public 2.395*** 2.133*** 0.121*** -0.008 -0.015 -0.014 0.032 0.003 
 (0.151) (0.156) (0.028) (0.027) (0.122) (0.046) (0.034) (0.058) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
HH no 14,328 7,789 14,328 14,328 14,328 14,328 14,328 14,328 
R-squared 0.688 0.699 0.587 0.385 0.209 0.186 0.399 0.048 
Panel B: 2009      
Public*after -0.040 -0.004 -0.049 -0.001 0.023 0.014 0.040 0.002 
 (0.060) (0.082) (0.030) (0.016) (0.082) (0.041) (0.029) (0.050) 
after -0.068 0.096 0.073*** 0.248*** 0.431*** 0.216*** -0.107*** 0.088** 
 (0.072) (0.103) (0.019) (0.017) (0.071) (0.044) (0.029) (0.040) 
public 2.259*** 2.121*** 0.175*** 0.028 0.004 0.116** 0.125*** -0.014 
 (0.127) (0.131) (0.036) (0.024) (0.125) (0.052) (0.042) (0.086) 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 14,598 7,869 14,598 14,598 14,598 14,598 14,598 14,598 
R-squared 0.699 0.697 0.611 0.371 0.206 0.180 0.369 0.054 
Notes: All dependent variables in columns (1)-(7) are in logs. Public =1 when at least one adult in the household is employed in the public sector, and 0 if no household member is employed in 
the public sector. The sample does not include households where the head is unemployed. After = 1 for households income/expenditures during June-December of the respective year, and 0, for 
January-May. 1 USD=3 RON. Alcohol and cigarettes expenditures are deflated with a specific indicator calculated by the National Bank of Romania to account for inflation and changes in the 
special excise taxes that apply to alcohol and cigarettes. The sample includes only urban households, as this is our group of interest in the next sections. Controls include: household head gender, 
education, age, no of kids, household occupational composition, county indicators and indicators for the month for which the income/expenditures are reported. Source: Authors’ calculations 















2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mother's characteristics at childbirth     
Age 27,582 27,704 27,925 28,241 32,854 33,488 34,078 33,686 28,919 29,128 29,340 29,644 25,11 24,973 25,181 25,451 
Education Secondary 0,287 0,284 0,262 0,242 0,003 0,015 0,006 0,02 0,105 0,09 0,082 0,07 0,596 0,592 0,584 0,573 
 High-school 0,397 0,372 0,351 0,324 0,001 0 0,001 0,003 0,421 0,388 0,346 0,303 0,363 0,363 0,358 0,355 
 High education 0,316 0,345 0,387 0,434 0,996 0,984 0,993 0,977 0,474 0,523 0,573 0,628 0,041 0,045 0,058 0,072 
Married 0,774 0,764 0,766 0,769 0,950 0,936 0,911 0,881 0,897 0,892 0,893 0,893 0,57 0,552 0,547 0,544 
Ethnicity: Romanian 0,932 0,929 0,934 0,932 0,971 0,966 0,954 0,966 0,943 0,946 0,950 0,949 0,911 0,903 0,91 0,906 
 Hungarian 0,045 0,043 0,040 0,040 0,022 0,034 0,038 0,027 0,052 0,048 0,045 0,045 0,031 0,03 0,029 0,028 
 Other 0,023 0,028 0,026 0,027 0,008 0,000 0,008 0,008 0,005 0,005 0,004 0,006 0,058 0,067 0,061 0,066 
Prenatal control 0,868 0,867 0,834 0,789 0,943 0,932 0,879 0,816 0,926 0,921 0,881 0,818 0,798 0,81 0,791 0,764 
No. of births 1,599 1,586 1,594 1,608 1,605 1,657 1,704 1,809 1,438 1,429 1,431 1,440 2 2,022 2,042 2,077 
No. of living children 1,604 1,588 1,593 1,608 1,610 1,662 1,703 1,808 1,443 1,432 1,430 1,440 2,008 2,023 2,039 2,077 
Hospital delivery 0,990 0,987 0,983 0,985 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,998 0,998 0,998 0,988 0,988 0,989 0,991 
Child’s  characteristics at birth 
Girl 0,485 0,480 0,484 0,487 0,492 0,485 0,488 0,495 0,484 0,478 0,482 0,489 0,487 0,484 0,489 0,48 
Birth weight 3230,040 3238,739 3233,877 3224,180 3315,247 3318,813 3305,611 3292,180 3284,204 3294,707 3282,664 3273,225 3136,077 3149,135 3149,45 3141,317 
Low birth weight 0,064 0,059 0,061 0,065 0,043 0,045 0,048 0,049 0,051 0,047 0,049 0,050 0,094 0,09 0,09 0,094 
Gestation duration (weeks) 38,884 38,791 38,780 38,765 38,886 38,728 38,707 38,690 38,946 38,842 38,844 38,806 38,776 38,698 38,696 38,699 
Premature delivery 0,070 0,070 0,072 0,068 0,057 0,061 0,063 0,063 0,059 0,059 0,058 0,058 0,088 0,088 0,089 0,084 
No. observations 76697 79517 79894 76160 9827 10219 10437 9801 48257 49803 50789 48867 22216 22228 21860 20128 
Notes: Mean values for pregnancies in utero at May 7th, in each corresponding year, that resulted in live births. Source: Authors’ calculations using the VSN files for 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. * ”Publicly employed 
(20-80)” refers to the women classified as publicly employed based on their predicted probabilities of working in the public sector, 20-80 split (see Section 4 for a detailed description). 
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Table 3. Selection into fertility 









Age Married Unemployed 
father 
All       
utero_2010 -0.007*** -0.026*** 0.033*** 0.166*** -0.097*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) 
       
Observations 312,268 312,268 312,268 312,268 86,432 312,268 
R-squared 0.035 0.025 0.073 0.031 0.036 0.030 
       
Publicly employed       
       
utero_2010 0.032*** 0.0004** -0.033*** 0.341*** -0.019*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) (0.000) 
       
Observations 40,284 40,284 40,284 40,284 40,284 40,284 
R-squared 0.022 0.007 0.025 0.060 0.016 0.013 
      
Privately employed      
       
utero_2010 -0.045*** -0.132*** 0.177*** 0.861*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Observations 157,167 157,167 157,167 157,167 157,167 157,167 
R-squared 0.028 0.049 0.076 0.016 0.013 0.019 
       
Housewives       
       
utero_2010 -0.034*** 0.008*** 0.025*** 0.013 0.037*** -0.097*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.021) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
Observations 86,432 86,432 86,432 86,432 86,432 86,432 
R-squared 0.026 0.020 0.014 0.011 0.017 0.036 
Each cell reports the estimated coefficient on the observable mothers’ characteristics from an OLS regression. 
All regressions include child’s month of birth, county specific indicators, (linear) time trends and county 
specific trends. We only consider children born in urban areas that were in utero May-December 2007-2010. 





Table 4. Low birth weight. Publicly employed vs. Housewives mothers 
 1st Trimester 2nd Trimester 3rd Trimester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: All          
public_utero2010 -0.015** -0.020*** -0.014* 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
public_utero2009   0.014   0.004   0.000 
   (0.009)   (0.006)   (0.005) 
public_utero2008   0.004   -0.001   -0.003 
   (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
public -0.047*** -0.005 -0.011 -0.046*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.040*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
          
Observations 27,401 27,401 27,401 57,318 57,318 57,318 41,997 41,997 41,997 
R-squared 0.145 0.329 0.330 0.093 0.261 0.261 0.016 0.141 0.141 
          
Panel B: Boys          
          
public_utero2010 -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.029** 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
public_utero2009   0.007   -0.001   0.006 
   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.008) 
public_utero2008   0.001   -0.000   0.002 
   (0.010)   (0.008)   (0.007) 
public -0.034*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.039*** -0.016*** -0.016* -0.033*** -0.017** -0.019** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) 
          
Observations 13,949 13,949 13,949 29,502 29,502 29,502 21,640 21,640 21,640 
R-squared 0.162 0.357 0.357 0.104 0.280 0.280 0.015 0.147 0.147 
          
Panel C: Girls          
          
public_utero2010 0.002 -0.007 0.002 0.005 -0.005 -0.002 0.006 0.005 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
public_utero2009   0.021   0.008   -0.007 
   (0.014)   (0.008)   (0.008) 
public_utero2008   0.004   -0.002   -0.009 
   (0.015)   (0.008)   (0.008) 
public -0.061*** -0.009 -0.018 -0.053*** -0.018** -0.021** -0.048*** -0.015* -0.010 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.018) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) 
          
Observations 13,452 13,452 13,452 27,816 27,816 27,816 20,357 20,357 20,357 
R-squared 0.136 0.309 0.309 0.086 0.246 0.246 0.021 0.138 0.138 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year&County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Controls include: child gender, gestational age at birth in weeks; mother’s age at birth and its square, mother’s education dummies, 
ethnicity dummies, marital status dummy, child’s parity, number of children alive, number of antenatal visits, gestation month of the first 
gynaecological visit, an indicator for home delivery, father’s age and its square, father’s employment status dummies; 42 county dummies, 9 
month of birth dummies; female unemployment rate in the month of conception for each county and year of birth. Robust standard errors 





Table 5. Low birth weight. Publicly employed vs. Housewives mothers, High educated mothers  
 1st Trimester 2nd Trimester 3rd Trimester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: All          
public_utero2010 -0.020** -0.024** -0.011 0.006 -0.001 0.007 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
public_utero2009   0.012   0.013*   0.001 
   (0.011)   (0.007)   (0.009) 
public_utero2008   0.025*   0.009   0.001 
   (0.013)   (0.008)   (0.009) 
public -0.010** -0.012 -0.025** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.014* 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
          
Observations 14,088 14,088 14,088 29,619 29,619 29,619 21,272 21,272 21,272 
R-squared 0.139 0.319 0.319 0.083 0.247 0.247 0.010 0.122 0.122 
          
Panel B: Boys          
public_utero2010 -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.025* 0.008 0.003 0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
public_utero2009   0.015   0.011   -0.003 
   (0.013)   (0.008)   (0.010) 
public_utero2008   0.028*   0.012   -0.005 
   (0.015)   (0.010)   (0.011) 
public -0.001 -0.005 -0.019* -0.016*** -0.014** -0.022*** -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
          
Observations 7,161 7,161 7,161 15,243 15,243 15,243 10,888 10,888 10,888 
R-squared 0.173 0.356 0.356 0.102 0.280 0.280 0.013 0.139 0.139 
          
Panel C: Girls          
public_utero2010 0.006 -0.001 0.010 0.004 -0.005 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
public_utero2009   0.010   0.016   0.007 
   (0.018)   (0.010)   (0.013) 
public_utero2008   0.022   0.006   0.009 
   (0.020)   (0.012)   (0.013) 
public -0.020*** -0.019** -0.030* -0.019*** -0.016** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.024** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.016) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) 
          
Observations 6,927 6,927 6,927 14,376 14,376 14,376 10,384 10,384 10,384 
R-squared 0.120 0.295 0.295 0.071 0.222 0.222 0.017 0.117 0.118 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year&County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Controls include: child gender, gestational age at birth in weeks; mother’s age at birth and its square, mother’s education dummies, 
ethnicity dummies, marital status dummy, child’s parity, number of children alive, number of antenatal visits, gestation month of the first 
gynaecological visit, an indicator for home delivery, father’s age and its square, father’s employment status dummies; 42 county dummies, 9 
month of birth dummies; female unemployment rate in the month of conception for each county and year of birth. Robust standard errors 






Table 6. Low birth weight. Publicly employed vs. Privately employed mothers 
 1st Trimester 2nd Trimester 3rd Trimester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: All          
public_utero2010 -0.010** -0.016*** -0.010 0.005 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
public_utero2009   0.008   -0.005   0.005 
   (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.004) 
public_utero2008   0.009*   -0.002   0.000 
   (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.004) 
Public -0.004* -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.005** -0.009*** -0.007 -0.007*** -0.008*** -
0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
          
Observations 41,370 41,370 41,370 89,591 89,591 89,591 66,490 66,490 66,490 
R-squared 0.127 0.320 0.320 0.088 0.244 0.244 0.006 0.119 0.119 
          
Panel B: Boys          
public_utero2010 -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.014 0.000 -0.008 -0.011 -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
public_utero2009   0.010   -0.007   0.005 
   (0.011)   (0.007)   (0.007) 
public_utero2008   0.016**   -0.003   0.001 
   (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.006) 
Public 0.004 -0.001 -0.010 -0.002 -0.008** -0.005 -0.004 -0.006* -0.008 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
          
Observations 21,324 21,324 21,324 46,330 46,330 46,330 34,409 34,409 34,409 
R-squared 0.155 0.340 0.340 0.100 0.259 0.259 0.008 0.126 0.126 
          
Panel C: Girls          
public_utero2010 0.003 -0.008 -0.006 0.010** 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
public_utero2009   0.006   -0.003   0.005 
   (0.009)   (0.006)   (0.008) 
public_utero2008   0.000   -0.001   -0.000 
   (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.007) 
Public -0.012*** -0.013* -0.015** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009* -0.010*** -0.010** -0.012 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
          
Observations 20,046 20,046 20,046 43,261 43,261 43,261 32,081 32,081 32,081 
R-squared 0.106 0.307 0.307 0.079 0.233 0.233 0.006 0.117 0.117 
          
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year&County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Controls include: child gender, gestational age at birth in weeks; mother’s age at birth and its square, mother’s education dummies, 
ethnicity dummies, marital status dummy, child’s parity, number of children alive, number of antenatal visits, gestation month of the first 
gynecological visit, an indicator for home delivery, father’s age and its square, father’s employment status dummies; 42 county dummies, 9 
month of birth dummies; female unemployment rate in the month of conception for each county and year of birth. Robust standard errors 




Table 7. Probability of a live birth being male. Publicly employed vs. Housewives mothers 
 1st Trimester 2nd Trimester 3rd Trimester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: All mothers         
public_utero2010 -0.030** -0.033** -0.034 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) 
public_utero2009   0.011   -0.002   0.015 
   (0.025)   (0.012)   (0.014) 
public_utero2008   -0.014   0.008   0.013 
   (0.022)   (0.010)   (0.020) 
public 0.007 0.016 0.017 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.016 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.020) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) 
          
Observations 27,401 27,401 27,401 57,318 57,318 57,318 41,997 41,997 41,997 
R-squared 0.004 0.020 0.020 0.002 0.021 0.021 0.002 0.024 0.024 
          
Panel B: High-educated mothers        
public_utero2010 -0.042** -0.045*** -0.057* -0.017 -0.019 -0.028* 0.003 -0.000 0.007 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) 
public_utero2009   -0.003   -0.020   0.007 
   (0.032)   (0.015)   (0.019) 
public_utero2008   -0.032   -0.005   0.013 
   (0.032)   (0.017)   (0.024) 
public 0.010 0.003 0.015 -0.007 -0.010 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.024) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) 
          
Observations 14,088 14,088 14,088 29,619 29,619 29,619 21,272 21,272 21,272 
R-squared 0.006 0.028 0.028 0.003 0.028 0.028 0.004 0.029 0.029 
          
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year&County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Controls include: birth weight, gestational age at birth in weeks; mother’s age at birth and its square, mother’s education dummies, 
ethnicity dummies, marital status dummy, child’s parity, number of children alive, number of antenatal visits, gestation month of the first 
gynecological visit, an indicator for home delivery, father’s age and its square, father’s employment status dummies; 42 county dummies, 9 
month of birth dummies; female unemployment rate in the month of conception for each county and year of birth. Robust standard errors 























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Low birth weight        
Exposed sibling  -0.033** -0.036** -0.039** -0.014** -0.015** -0.003 
 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Controls  no yes yes no yes yes 
Family FE  no no yes no no yes 
Month of birth FE  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time Trend  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  3,189 3,189 3,189 28,208 28,208 28,208 
No of groups    1,819   12,565 
R-squared 














Panel B: Probability of a male birth        
Exposed sibling  0.010 0.018 0.011 0.010 0.007 -0.003 
 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.045) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Controls  no yes yes no yes yes 
Family FE  no no yes no no yes 
Month of birth FE  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Time Trend  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  3,189 3,189 3,189 28,208 28,208 28,208 
No of groups    1,819   12,565 
R-squared 














Notes: All regressions are based on the urban sample; in columns (1)-(3) we consider publicly employed women that gave 
birth in 2010, in column (4)-(6) we show the housewives mothers giving birth in 2010.  The controls are: a gender dummy, 
pregnancy order, gestation month of the first gynaecological visit; parents characteristics: the age of mother at conception 
and its square, the age of the father at conception and its square; calendar month of birth dummies and a time trend. These 
specifications are based on the mother’s status at the time of birth in 2010. Source: Authors’ calculation using the 2003-2010 





Table 9. Low Birth weight. Publicly employed with employed husbands vs. Housewives with husbands with occupational 
status different from employed 
 1st Trimester 2nd Trimester 3rd Trimester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: All          
public_utero2010 -0.011 -0.017** -0.005 0.002 -0.008 -0.010 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
public_utero2009   0.022*   0.001   0.006 
   (0.012)   (0.008)   (0.007) 
public_utero2008   0.008   -0.008   0.001 
   (0.009)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
public -0.071*** -0.033* -0.044** -0.062*** -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.056*** -0.044*** -0.046*** 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.021) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) 
          
Observations 17,537 17,537 17,537 36,121 36,121 36,121 26,044 26,044 26,044 
R-squared 0.159 0.354 0.355 0.109 0.283 0.283 0.024 0.155 0.155 
          
Panel B: Boys           
public_utero2010 -0.029** -0.029** -0.019 -0.001 -0.008 -0.013 0.002 -0.002 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
public_utero2009   0.015   -0.005   0.017** 
   (0.012)   (0.010)   (0.008) 
public_utero2008   0.010   -0.011   0.011 




















Observations          
R-squared 8,919 8,919 8,919 18,413 18,413 18,413 13,324 13,324 13,324 
          
Panel C: Girls          
public_utero2010 0.008 -0.002 0.010 0.005 -0.009 -0.008 0.001 0.001 -0.004 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
public_utero2009   0.027   0.007   -0.005 
   (0.021)   (0.011)   (0.010) 
public_utero2008   0.002   -0.006   -0.008 
   (0.016)   (0.009)   (0.009) 
public -0.090*** -0.052** -0.063** -0.067*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.061*** -0.031 -0.026 
 (0.009) (0.024) (0.029) (0.006) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.020) (0.021) 
          
Observations 8,618 8,618 8,618 17,708 17,708 17,708 12,720 12,720 12,720 
R-squared 0.152 0.337 0.337 0.102 0.264 0.265 0.030 0.156 0.156 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year&County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Controls include: child gender, gestational age at birth in weeks; mother’s age at birth and its square, mother’s education dummies, ethnicity 
dummies, marital status dummy, child’s parity, number of children alive, number of antenatal visits, gestation month of the first gynaecological visit, 
an indicator for home delivery, father’s age and its square, father’s employment status dummies; 42 county dummies, 9 month of birth dummies; 
female unemployment rate in the month of conception for each county and year of birth. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level shown in 




Table 10. Probability of a male birth. Publicly employed with employed husbands vs. Housewives with husbands with no 
activity 
 1st Trimester 2nd Trimester 3rd Trimester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
public_utero2010 -0.031 -0.032* -0.035 -0.001 0.001 0.006 -0.015 -0.009 -0.020 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) 
public_utero2009   0.007   -0.001   -0.013 
   (0.029)   (0.014)   (0.015) 
public_utero2008   -0.017   0.017   -0.017 
   (0.023)   (0.013)   (0.020) 
public 0.008 -0.029 -0.026 -0.006 -0.021 -0.027 -0.005 -0.001 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.033) (0.036) (0.006) (0.025) (0.025) (0.008) (0.033) (0.035) 
          
Observations 17,537 17,537 17,537 36,121 36,121 36,121 26,044 26,044 26,044 
R-squared 0.005 0.024 0.024 0.002 0.021 0.021 0.003 0.025 0.025 
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year&County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Controls include: birth weight, gestational age at birth in weeks; mother’s age at birth and its square, mother’s education dummies, 
ethnicity dummies, marital status dummy, child’s parity, number of children alive, number of antenatal visits, gestation month of the first 
gynaecological visit, an indicator for home delivery, father’s age and its square, father’s employment status dummies; 42 county dummies, 9 
month of birth dummies; female unemployment rate in the month of conception for each county and year of birth. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Appendix A – not for publication 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics, urban and rural sample 
    All Publicly employed* (20-80) Housewives Employed 
    2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mother's characteristics at childbirth 
  
    
  
    
  
  
    
Age 
 
26,631 26,740 26,916 27,203 31,881 32,292 32,789 31,870 24,965 24,901 25,056 25,250 28,424 28,628 28,833 29,162 
Education Secondary 0,440 0,432 0,409 0,389 0,005 0,012 0,009 0,020 0,700 0,695 0,682 0,674 0,157 0,142 0,130 0,114 
 
Highschool 0,361 0,348 0,340 0,322 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,006 0,279 0,283 0,289 0,289 0,448 0,420 0,382 0,340 
 
Higher ed. 
0,199 0,22 0,251 0,289 0,995 0,987 0,99 0,974 0,021 0,022 0,03 0,037 0,394 0,438 0,488 0,546 
Urban 
 
0,547 0,551 0,552 0,559 0,786 0,734 0,724 0,594 0,354 0,354 0,347 0,350 0,734 0,731 0,734 0,742 
Married 
 
0,745 0,733 0,729 0,728 0,949 0,937 0,920 0,904 0,627 0,606 0,595 0,587 0,891 0,885 0,886 0,886 
Ethnicity: Romanian 0,917 0,914 0,920 0,918 0,956 0,948 0,942 0,941 0,903 0,901 0,909 0,905 0,930 0,931 0,937 0,936 
 
Hungarian 0,049 0,049 0,046 0,046 0,036 0,050 0,049 0,052 0,035 0,033 0,032 0,031 0,064 0,063 0,058 0,058 
 
Other 0,034 0,037 0,034 0,037 0,008 0,001 0,009 0,007 0,062 0,066 0,059 0,064 0,006 0,006 0,006 0,006 
Prenatal control 0,848 0,850 0,821 0,790 0,934 0,928 0,877 0,826 0,805 0,813 0,791 0,775 0,914 0,911 0,877 0,824 
No. of births 1,822 1,808 1,818 1,833 1,580 1,609 1,670 1,726 2,178 2,196 2,210 2,246 1,505 1,496 1,502 1,508 
No. of living children 1,826 1,809 1,816 1,833 1,585 1,613 1,669 1,726 2,181 2,195 2,206 2,245 1,512 1,500 1,500 1,508 
Hospital delivery 0,985 0,983 0,982 0,983 0,999 0,999 0,998 0,998 0,983 0,982 0,984 0,984 0,998 0,997 0,997 0,997 
Child's characteristics at birth 
  
    
  
    
  
  
    
Girl 
 
0,486 0,483 0,485 0,487 0,491 0,482 0,488 0,493 0,487 0,486 0,487 0,487 0,484 0,479 0,483 0,488 
Birth weight 3206,466 3215,966 3217,471 3207,870 3315,183 3323,001 3308,198 3299,508 3144,569 3155,117 3161,942 3151,450 3278,428 3289,368 3281,505 3271,363 
Low birth weight 0,071 0,068 0,067 0,071 0,044 0,043 0,047 0,047 0,091 0,089 0,086 0,090 0,053 0,049 0,050 0,052 
Gestation duration (weeks) 38,859 38,763 38,772 38,764 38,908 38,772 38,753 38,761 38,787 38,693 38,717 38,723 38,949 38,839 38,850 38,819 
Premature delivery 0,077 0,077 0,077 0,074 0,056 0,057 0,061 0,059 0,088 0,090 0,088 0,085 0,061 0,061 0,059 0,060 
No. observations 140250 144256 144782 136331 13403 13982 14201 13284 62818 62709 62909 57588 65743 68117 69168 65881 
Notes: Mean values for pregnancies in utero at May 7th, in each corresponding year, that resulted in live births. Source: Authors’ calculations using the VSN files for 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. * ”Publicly employed 
(20-80)” refers to the women classified as publicly employed based on their predicted probabilities of working in the public sector, 20-80 split (see Section 4 for a detailed description). 
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Table A2. Selection into fertility, DiD specification 









Age Married Unemployed 
father 
       
pub80_utero10 0.045*** 0.009 -0.055*** -1.196*** -0.028** -0.008** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.005) (0.281) (0.012) (0.004) 
pub80_utero09 0.020** 0.003 -0.023*** -0.055 -0.011 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.274) (0.010) (0.004) 
pub80_utero08 0.018** -0.001 -0.017*** 0.304 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.218) (0.008) (0.005) 
Public -0.587*** -0.361*** 0.948*** 12.865*** 0.382*** -0.011*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.440) (0.016) (0.003) 
       
Observations 126,716 126,716 126,716 126,716 126,716 126,716 
R-squared 0.312 0.163 0.833 0.250 0.157 0.054 
Notes: Controls include: child gender, gestational age at birth in weeks; 42 county dummies, 9 month of birth 
dummies, birth year fixed effects and county specific time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at the 







Table A3. Low birth weight: Publicly employed vs. housewives mothers, full sample 
 1st Trimester 2nd Trimester 3rd Trimester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: All          
public_utero2010 -0.009* -
0.015*** 
-0.009 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
public_utero2009   0.011   -0.002   0.003 
   (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
public_utero2008   0.004   -0.004   -0.004 
   (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
Public -0.047*** -0.012* -0.017** -0.045*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.040*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
          
Observations 64,593 64,593 64,593 135,298 135,298 135,298 100,987 100,987 100,987 
R-squared 0.134 0.318 0.318 0.088 0.251 0.251 0.014 0.140 0.140 
          
Panel B: Boys          
public_utero2010 -0.020*** -
0.020*** 
-0.015* -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
public_utero2009   0.010   0.002   0.001 
   (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
public_utero2008   0.006   0.000   -0.008* 
   (0.007)   (0.005)   (0.005) 
Public -0.036*** -0.007 -0.012 -0.038*** -0.012*** -0.013** -0.036*** -0.019*** -0.017** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
          
Observations 33,095 33,095 33,095 69,371 69,371 69,371 51,865 51,865 51,865 
R-squared 0.143 0.332 0.332 0.100 0.267 0.267 0.013 0.145 0.145 
          
Panel C: Girls          
public_utero2010 0.002 -0.009 -0.004 0.010** 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
public_utero2009   0.011   -0.007   0.005 
   (0.011)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
public_utero2008   0.003   -0.009   0.000 
   (0.013)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
Public -0.058*** -0.016* -0.021* -0.052*** -0.011* -0.006 -0.044*** -0.012** -0.014* 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
          
Observations 31,498 31,498 31,498 65,927 65,927 65,927 49,122 49,122 49,122 
R-squared 0.130 0.306 0.306 0.079 0.238 0.238 0.016 0.136 0.136 
Notes: Controls include: child gender, gestational age at birth in weeks; mother’s age at birth and its square, mother’s education dummies, 
ethnicity dummies, marital status dummy, child’s parity, number of children alive, number of antenatal visits, gestation month of the first 
gynecological visit, an indicator for home delivery, father’s age and its square, father’s employment status dummies; 42 county dummies, 9 
month of birth dummies; female unemployment rate in the month of conception for each county and year of birth. Robust standard errors 






Table A4. Probability of a birth being male: Publicly employed vs. Privately employed mothers 
 1st Trimester 2nd Trimester 3rd Trimester 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
public_utero2010 -0.000 -0.005 -0.000 0.008 0.007 0.007 -0.010 -0.012 -0.015 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) 
public_utero2009   0.007   -0.001   -0.008 
   (0.024)   (0.011)   (0.011) 
public_utero2008   0.007   0.000   -0.001 
   (0.021)   (0.009)   (0.015) 
Public -0.008 -0.008 -0.013 -0.009* -0.015** -0.015* -0.006 0.000 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) 
          
Observations 41,370 41,370 41,370 89,591 89,591 89,591 66,490 66,490 66,490 
R-squared 0.002 0.026 0.026 0.001 0.025 0.025 0.001 0.030 0.030 
          
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year&County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Controls include: child gender, gestational age at birth in weeks; mother’s age at birth and its square, mother’s education dummies, 
ethnicity dummies, marital status dummy, child’s parity, number of children alive, number of antenatal visits, gestation month of the first 
gynecological visit, an indicator for home delivery, father’s age and its square, father’s employment status dummies; 42 county dummies, 9 
month of birth dummies; female unemployment rate in the month of conception for each county and year of birth. Robust standard errors 
















Tertiary education - no of enrolled students Males Females
Figures 
Source: Statistics Romania.  
 
Figure A2. Educational level of employed mothers  
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 Figure A1. Higher education enrollment in Romania 
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Figure A3. Low birth weight incidence, by month of birth 
 













Appendix B - Not for publication 
 
The likelihood of maternal employment in the public sector 
Employment in the public sector is the key variable in our identification strategy. However, the Vital 
Statistics Natality (VSN) files, contains information only on the employment status of the mother 
without specification of the sector, i.e., private or public. We address this problem by using the 
Romanian Household Budget Survey (RHBS), a nationwide representative survey which provides 
detailed socio-economic information on every member of the household, to construct a characteristics-
based likelihood of employment in the public sector for each mother. The RHBS has the same 
employment categories as VSN, but further disentangles between public and private sector.  
B1. Main specification: Probit estimation 
We use a reduced form Probit model to estimate the probability of being employed in the public 
sector, conditional on being employed in a wage job, for women aged 16 to 50. Our sample consists of 
the employed women aged 16-45, included in the 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 RHBS. The dependent 
variable is the sector of employment (1 if publicly employed, 0 if privately employed).We include as 
explanatory variables all the characteristics that are also available in the VSN, as we will employ of 
out sample predictions on the VSN sample to assign each mother a predicted probability of public 
employment based on all her observable characteristics. We estimate the specification separately for 
each of the years of interest so as to capture the potential changes in the employment in the public 
sector. We cluster the standard errors at region level and use the corresponding household frequency 
weights. Our main specification of the reduced form model of public employment is: 
global z "varsta varsta2 i.stciv i.scm i.etnic i.urban i.regiune nnv i.scm#i.urban vtata  i.acttata" 
                                         
                                                           
                                                              
                                          
where: 
Public sector employment: binary variable, 1 if employed in the public sector  
age: age of mother at birth of child 
married: binary variable, 1 if married 
i.ethnicity: categorical variable for ethnicity, 1 if Romanian, 2 if Hungarian, 3 if Other ethnicity 
i.educ: categorical variable for educational level, 1 if primary, 2 if secondary, 3 if tertiary 
i.urban: binary variable for area of residence, 1 if urban area 
i.region: categorical variable for macro-region of residence 
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number_children: number of children belonging to the mother 
husband’s_age husband’s age 
husband’s_occupation categorical variable for husband’s occupational status 
The estimation results for the 4 year are presented in Table B1.  
Table B1 Reduced form Probit estimation, main specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 2007 2008 2009 2010 
     
age 0.135*** 0.073* 0.136*** 0.055 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.035) (0.041) 
Age squared -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
married 0.101 0.098 0.051 -0.010 
 (0.077) (0.085) (0.087) (0.071) 
divorced -0.113 0.071 -0.005 0.084 
 (0.077) (0.102) (0.107) (0.100) 
widdowed 0.164 0.098 -0.193 0.071 
 (0.213) (0.176) (0.232) (0.260) 
Secondary school -0.376 -0.256 -0.148 -0.074 
 (0.406) (0.320) (0.325) (0.546) 
Professional school -0.692* -0.365 -0.589* -0.452 
 (0.411) (0.323) (0.319) (0.532) 
High school -0.227 0.033 -0.181 -0.032 
 (0.404) (0.320) (0.333) (0.524) 
Post high school 0.710 0.920*** 0.413 1.181** 
 (0.447) (0.351) (0.359) (0.591) 
Higher 1.332*** 1.331*** 0.947*** 1.339** 
 (0.418) (0.304) (0.328) (0.534) 
Other situations -0.645 -0.453 -0.423  
 (0.692) (0.842) (0.609)  
Hungarian -0.174** -0.041 -0.016 -0.137 
 (0.084) (0.072) (0.112) (0.103) 
Other 0.281 -0.423* 0.254 0.103 
 (0.177) (0.219) (0.163) (0.188) 
Urban 0.020 0.646 0.174 0.562 
 (0.421) (0.557) (0.387) (0.732) 
Region 2 -0.203** -0.163 -0.208** -0.085 
 (0.081) (0.110) (0.091) (0.108) 
Region 3 -0.191* -0.296** -0.223** -0.279** 
 (0.114) (0.140) (0.099) (0.114) 
Region 4 -0.001 -0.172 -0.090 0.059 
 (0.130) (0.148) (0.096) (0.135) 
Region 5 -0.197** -0.290 -0.342*** -0.261** 
 (0.093) (0.188) (0.118) (0.127) 
Region 6 -0.234** -0.399*** -0.362*** -0.123 
 (0.109) (0.112) (0.123) (0.112) 
Region 7 -0.210** -0.143 -0.188** -0.095 
 (0.098) (0.119) (0.094) (0.143) 
Region 8 -0.517*** -0.381*** -0.412*** -0.220** 
 (0.078) (0.106) (0.062) (0.094) 
Number of children 0.057** 0.057** 0.060*** 0.113*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.027) 
2o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2.scm#1.urban 0.232 -0.709 -0.192 -0.793 
 (0.454) (0.555) (0.430) (0.729) 
3o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
3.scm#1.urban -0.069 -0.762 -0.098 -0.562 
 (0.440) (0.561) (0.381) (0.735) 
4o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
4.scm#1.urban -0.126 -0.793 -0.353 -0.675 
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 (0.421) (0.557) (0.387) (0.759) 
5o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
5.scm#1.urban -0.122 -0.809 -0.089 -0.639 
 (0.483) (0.568) (0.435) (0.790) 
6o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
6.scm#1.urban -0.904** -1.338** -0.689* -1.296* 
 (0.460) (0.526) (0.400) (0.716) 
7o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
7o.scm#1o.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Husband’s age 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Employed husband -0.132 -0.048 -0.151 0.092 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.097) (0.084) 
Entrepreneur husband -0.503** -0.590** -0.319 0.115 
 (0.235) (0.246) (0.274) (0.218) 
Self employed in non-
agriculture husband 
-0.106 -0.112 -0.117 0.039 
 (0.136) (0.119) (0.143) (0.121) 
Self employed in agriculture 
husband 
-0.097 0.100 0.059 0.316** 
 (0.166) (0.138) (0.165) (0.134) 
Unemployed husband -0.113 -0.013 -0.206 0.101 
 (0.115) (0.128) (0.153) (0.103) 
Pensioner husband -0.005 -0.033 -0.132 0.091 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.111) (0.219) 
Other situations husbad -0.255 0.113 -0.044 0.517** 
 (0.289) (0.388) (0.235) (0.206) 
    (0.000) 
     
Observations 2,156,214 2,205,766 2,156,058 2,041,875 
 
B2. Robustness checks 
B2.1 Probit estimation, RHBS sample of all employed women, no age restriction 
As a robustness check of the above Probit specification we estimate a specification on the entire 
sample of employed women included in the 2007-2010 RHBS, without the age restriction previously 
imposed. This could entail significant differences if women above the fertile age (45 in our case), are 
overly represented in the public sector. 
We generate the predicted probabilities of being employed in the public sector using all observable 
characteristics, i.e., at all the combinations of the values of the covariates. We take region 3 as 
example. For region 3, year 2010, the pairwise correlation between the predicted probabilities of 
public employment based on the restricted sample of employed women of fertile age and the predicted 
probabilities of public employment based on the entire sample of employed women is 99.45%, 
significantly different from 0 at 1% significance level.  
For region 3, year 2010, the pairwise correlation between the actually assigned (to the employed 
mothers in the VSN) predicted probabilities based on the restricted sample of employed women of 
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fertile age and the actually assigned  predicted probabilities based on the entire sample of employed 
women is 99.61%, significantly different from 0 at 1% significance level.  
We are thus reassured that the predicted probabilities based on the restricted sample of fertile age 
employed women are not a biased measure of the true probability of being employed in the public 
sector.  
B2.2 Probit estimation, RHBS sample of mothers 
A potential threat to our main probability estimation strategy (in we assign each employed mother in 
the VSN a probability of working in the public sector based on the probabilities estimated for women 
of fertile age) is that the probabilities of public employment for women of fertile age (but that are not 
necessarily mothers) are not representative for the probabilities of public employment for mothers. 
This could be due to the existence of unobservable characteristics that determine both the selection 
into motherhood and the selection into public sector employment.  
To address this problem we estimate the probability of being employed in the public sector on the 
restricted sample of mothers included in the 2007-2010 RHBS. Thus, we obtain the probability of 
public employment conditional on being an employed mother in the fertile age.   
We use the same household level data from RHBS, from which we select only mothers with at least 
one child under the age of 1 at the date of the survey.
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  Since the number of employed mothers with 
children under 1 included in the survey is much smaller than the number of employed women in the 
fertile age, we do not estimate different probabilities of public employment for each year, but rather 
estimate an average probability of public employment over the period 2007-2010. Our restricted 
sample includes 883 employed mothers, each weighed with the corresponding frequency weight. 
We estimate the same specification using the above presented reduced form Probit model, and 
generate predicted probabilities in a similar manner. 
For region 3, year 2010, the pairwise correlation between the predicted probabilities based on the 
sample of employed women and the predicted probabilities based on the sample of employed mothers 
is 81,46%, significant at 1% significance level; the pairwise correlation between the actually assigned 
(to the employed mothers in the VSN) predicted probabilities based on the restricted sample of 
employed women of fertile age and the actually assigned  predicted probabilities based on the sample 
of employed mothers is 73.69%.  
 
                                                          
52 We have data only on employment status in the past year. By selecting mothers with children less than 1 year as opposed to 
mothers with older children we reduce the possibility of including in the sample mothers that changed the sector of 
employment after the birth of her children and before the survey. 
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B2.3 Probit estimation, exclusion restriction 
As a third robustness check, we have estimated the probability of being employed in the public sector 
conditional on being employed using an extended Probit specification. As opposed to our main 
strategy where the covariates included in the Probit estimation are the mother characteristics that are 
also available in the VSN, we have estimated a reduced form equation in which we include all relevant 
variables available in the RHBS. We thus include as additional variables such the type of employment 
contract (permanent or temporary), the in kind benefits received at the workplace (such as telephone or 
company car), and a dummy variable for the husband’s employment in the public sector. Since we 
continue to assign probabilities to the mothers in the VSN only on their observable characteristics 
included in the VSN, these additional covariates are analogous to the exclusion restrictions in an IV 
setting. 
Our extended specification of the reduced form model of public employment is: 
                         
                                                        
                                                              
                                            
where: 
Public sector employment: binary variable, 1 if employed in the public sector  
married: binary variable, 1 if married or concubine 
Romanian (Hungarian): binary variable, 1 if of Romanian (Hungarian) ethnicity 
i.educ: categorical variable for educational level, 1 if primary, 2 if secondary, 3 if tertiary 
i.urban: binary variable for area of residence, 1 if urban area 
i.region: categorical variable for macroregion of residence 
parttime: binary variable, 1 if on a part time employment contract 
benefits: binary variable, 1 if in kind benefits (company telephone, car, etc)  are provided in addition to 
the monetary wage 







Table B2 Reduced form Probit estimation, extended specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 2007 2008 2009 2010 
     
Age 0.056 0.085** 0.141*** 0.056 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) 
Age2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Not married -0.013 0.096 0.044 -0.013 
 (0.072) (0.083) (0.089) (0.072) 
Divorced 0.089 0.060 -0.018 0.089 
 (0.098) (0.105) (0.106) (0.098) 
Widdowed 0.053 0.123 -0.200 0.053 
 (0.258) (0.171) (0.239) (0.258) 
Secondary school -0.142 -0.285 -0.150 -0.142 
 (0.514) (0.319) (0.328) (0.514) 
Professional school -0.511 -0.362 -0.565* -0.511 
 (0.496) (0.321) (0.318) (0.496) 
High school -0.108 0.000 -0.173 -0.108 
 (0.493) (0.319) (0.329) (0.493) 
Post high school 1.098** 0.901*** 0.484 1.098** 
 (0.538) (0.348) (0.359) (0.538) 
Higher 1.233** 1.275*** 0.931*** 1.233** 
 (0.503) (0.304) (0.324) (0.503) 
Other situations 0.000   0.000 
 (0.000)   (0.000) 
Hungarian -0.111 -0.049 -0.004 -0.111 
 (0.105) (0.074) (0.111) (0.105) 
Other 0.082 -0.409* 0.278* 0.082 
 (0.190) (0.217) (0.158) (0.190) 
Urban 0.504 0.668 0.267 0.504 
 (0.744) (0.563) (0.398) (0.744) 
Region 2 -0.099 -0.162 -0.213** -0.099 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.086) (0.112) 
Region 3 -0.284** -0.265** -0.222** -0.284** 
 (0.113) (0.133) (0.091) (0.113) 
Region 4 0.024 -0.205 -0.131 0.024 
 (0.134) (0.155) (0.104) (0.134) 
Region 5 -0.244** -0.253 -0.301** -0.244** 
 (0.123) (0.178) (0.118) (0.123) 
Region 6 -0.129 -0.377*** -0.334*** -0.129 
 (0.112) (0.116) (0.117) (0.112) 
Region 7 -0.105 -0.102 -0.179** -0.105 
 (0.151) (0.128) (0.090) (0.151) 
Region 8 -0.246** -0.408*** -0.432*** -0.246** 
 (0.098) (0.111) (0.059) (0.098) 
Number of children 0.109*** 0.054** 0.055** 0.109*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) 
2o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2.scm#1.urban -0.755 -0.701 -0.256 -0.755 
 (0.736) (0.554) (0.439) (0.736) 
3o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
3.scm#1.urban -0.498 -0.746 -0.157 -0.498 
 (0.750) (0.560) (0.391) (0.750) 
4o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
4.scm#1.urban -0.603 -0.758 -0.409 -0.603 
 (0.769) (0.559) (0.396) (0.769) 
5o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
5.scm#1.urban -0.551 -0.797 -0.194 -0.551 
 (0.784) (0.576) (0.442) (0.784) 
6o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
6.scm#1.urban -1.216* -1.296** -0.752* -1.216* 
 (0.727) (0.527) (0.417) (0.727) 
7o.scm#0b.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
7o.scm#1o.urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Husband’s age 0.008 0.003 0.007* 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Employed husband 0.093 -0.052 -0.144 0.093 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.099) (0.086) 
Entrepreneur husband 0.067 -0.655*** -0.382 0.067 
 (0.226) (0.250) (0.273) (0.226) 
Self employed in non-
agriculture husband 
0.055 -0.124 -0.126 0.055 
 (0.124) (0.121) (0.144) (0.124) 
Self employed in agriculture 
husband 
0.341** 0.114 0.066 0.341** 
 (0.138) (0.137) (0.165) (0.138) 
Unemployed husband 0.127 -0.043 -0.189 0.127 
 (0.109) (0.130) (0.156) (0.109) 
Pensioner husband 0.100 -0.054 -0.119 0.100 
 (0.227) (0.132) (0.109) (0.227) 
Other situations husbad 0.481** 0.087 -0.023 0.481** 
 (0.208) (0.399) (0.244) (0.208) 
In kind benefits -0.509*** -0.344*** -0.462*** -0.509*** 
 (0.103) (0.070) (0.076) (0.103) 
Part time contract -0.392 0.412 0.301 -0.392 
 (0.346) (0.285) (0.249) (0.346) 
     
     
Observations 2,041,875 2,205,766 2,156,058 2,041,875 
 
